

OPERATION REDLIST

Hunted in the Shadows

VOLUME I



When Justice Tools Turn Political
How INTERPOL Became a Weapon in the
Hands of Dictators

HOPE PARADISE

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Volume I

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When Justice Tools Turn Political

How INTERPOL Became a Weapon in the Hands of Dictators

By: Hope Paradise - 2025

Operation Redlist – Volume I

Hunted in the Shadows

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Tribute

This book could not have been written without the courage of those who shared their experiences—despite fear, trauma, and threat.

I am deeply grateful for their trust.

I also thank those who supported the process in silence, with no recognition or expectation, just belief in the power of truth.

Since I cannot name the individuals below due to their own requests, I have given them names—names that come not from a list, but from the heart of this book itself.

The first, I call **Sun** and **Moon**, because during the darkest, coldest nights of writing, they warmed and lit both my soul and my body more than the sun or the moon ever could alone. Without their presence, this book would never have started—or it would have ended halfway through.

The second, I name **Companion**—because he constantly reminded me of the structure, the forgotten notes, and the purpose behind turning these scattered thoughts and interviews into a real book. His tireless efforts, without expectation or demand, shaped this project into what it has become. (Special Thanks to Mr. E)

The third is not a single person, but a team I call **The Rescue Group**—honest lawyers and truth-seeking souls who supported the primary victim of this story, as well as us, in seeing clearly what had truly happened. Had they not fulfilled their responsibility, the victim would likely have been executed by now. (Special Thanks to Ms. Y, Mr. M, Mr. U & Ms. M.B)

The fourth is a former Iranian police officer who chose the name **Agent R853** for himself. Without his fearless, candid, and detailed contributions, this book would not only lack a foundation, but it would also have lacked a soul.

“This book is dedicated to all individuals and families who have suffered under authoritarian regimes across the world, and in particular, to the more than 13,000 victims of political executions, and the thousands killed during public protests against the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979; to their bereaved families, and to all those who have been wounded, imprisoned, or tortured for standing up to tyranny.”

Hope Paradise

Legal Disclaimer

The following legal declarations are intended to clarify the ethical, legal, and editorial foundations of this work and to ensure transparency for readers, institutions, and legal entities.

This book is an independent and documented account, compiled through extensive research, the review of both official and unofficial sources, and exclusive interviews with individuals possessing direct knowledge and experience regarding the issues discussed. This publication was developed with an unwavering commitment to factual integrity and journalistic neutrality, ensuring that every account, statement, or citation included serves the broader goal of transparency, public interest, and historical record.

The primary content of this book is based on a series of in-depth interviews with a former officer of Iran's national police force. This individual served for many years in several positions involving access to classified and sensitive police intelligence and had direct and practical involvement with domestic operations involving INTERPOL coordination through Iran's national bureau (NCB) or related security agencies as part of the country's internal judicial and security systems.

The perspectives reflected throughout the book arise from real and expert-level engagement with INTERPOL procedures—especially in

contexts where these mechanisms have been exploited by authoritarian regimes, including the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is imperative to emphasize that all efforts have been made to distinguish factual reporting from analytical opinion, and the latter is clearly marked or inferred through contextual framing.

This work does not seek to offer legal, institutional, or political conclusions, nor does it claim to represent the official views of any government, organization, or international body. Rather, it aims to raise public awareness, preserve documentation, and shed light on underreported patterns of misuse involving global law enforcement systems.

Where applicable, supporting documentation has been included within the book. Additional evidence—such as formal court filings in other countries, official correspondence from the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), and other corroborating materials—has also been reviewed and utilized during the compilation of this work. Where direct documentation could not be obtained due to security risks or confidentiality limitations, triangulated sources and corroborative evidence were prioritized to ensure reliability.

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All information presented in this book has been compiled through:

- A systematic review of official state media and affiliated news agencies operated by the Iranian government,
- Interviews with a highly experienced and security-connected former officer from within Iran's law enforcement system, and
- Analytical assessment of reports and articles published by internationally recognised news organizations.

While this book references official and unofficial sources, the responsibility for the accuracy and implications of those external statements lies solely with the original sources. The author and publisher bear no legal responsibility for third-party content.

All documents presented in this book have been published with the full and informed consent of the victim. Any redacted sections have been omitted solely to prevent potential harm or risk. Complete and unedited original copies of these materials are available for submission to accredited human rights institutions and international courts upon formal request.

This work does not accuse INTERPOL or any of its staff of wrongdoing; rather, it highlights structural vulnerabilities that allow for potential abuse. The contents of this work are intended to contribute constructively to ongoing discussions around international justice, accountability, and the ethical limits of institutional cooperation with authoritarian states.

Also, this work is protected by international human rights and freedom of expression laws, including Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

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This book does not aim to undermine the legitimacy or operational credibility of international institutions such as INTERPOL or the judicial authorities of any country. Its sole purpose is to highlight systemic vulnerabilities and to advocate for the need for institutional reform in order to prevent the political misuse of global enforcement mechanisms.

By drawing attention to these systemic risks, the author hopes to encourage reforms that uphold the original spirit and integrity of global policing frameworks.

The author of this work, acting as compiler and narrator, has undertaken this project in good faith and in accordance with a sense of civic responsibility. There is no personal hostility or malicious intent toward any of the individuals or entities referenced herein.

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The use of narrative framing in this work is intended solely for protection of the individuals involved and should not be interpreted as a misrepresentation or fabrication of factual content.

Several sections of this book are reproduced directly from recorded interviews and conversations conducted between the author and the witness, presented exactly as conveyed by the source. In order to preserve the accuracy, credibility, and integrity of the testimony, the author has intentionally avoided altering, embellishing, or omitting any part of the account.

This book is fundamentally the result of structured interviews and a series of direct question-and-answer exchanges between the author and the interviewee, who is either a firsthand witness or a victim of the events described.

All narrative elements, where anonymity has been preserved, are crafted in a manner that honours the truth of the source without compromising their safety or distorting the events described.

All questions and statements presented in this book arise directly from the context of the events, evidence, and narratives documented herein. The dialogue and reflections are a product of the author's and contributors' sincere human curiosity, rooted in personal search for clarity and understanding.

The responses offered throughout are not presented as definitive legal conclusions, but rather as individual or analytical interpretations based on the documented materials, testimonies, and incidents discussed in this book.

Given that the former Iranian police officer interviewed in this book is a native Persian speaker, certain words or expressions may have been unintentionally altered, misinterpreted, or adapted during the process of translation or authorial interpretation. However, every reasonable effort has been made to preserve the accuracy and authenticity of the original statements and to avoid any distortion that could misrepresent the factual substance of the testimony.

All translations were conducted manually by the author with due consideration for context, tone, and intended meaning. No automated translation tools were used in the rendering of interview materials or quoted dialogue. However, final drafts were reviewed multiple times using digital linguistic tools to ensure consistency and clarity, and the final version has been released with the consultation and approval of the interviewee.

To eliminate any potential ambiguity in this regard, a Persian-language digital edition of this book will be released shortly after the publication of the English version.

Accordingly, readers are advised to regard all assessments, hypotheses, and expressed viewpoints as personal or context-based reflections, not as absolute or official determinations of fact.

It should be noted that any inquiries or concerns regarding the content of this book will be addressed by the author, provided that such

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This book does not promote or support any political agenda. It is solely a factual and experiential testimony aimed at highlighting the risks of institutional misuse by authoritarian states.

It neither endorses nor opposes any political group, opposition movement, or government—whether within or outside the Islamic Republic of Iran. The purpose of this work is not to contribute to partisan debates but to document systemic patterns of abuse, grounded in verifiable evidence and first-person accounts.

The author firmly believes in the universal values of justice, transparency, and accountability, regardless of political ideologies. Any reference to specific regimes, parties, or institutions is made strictly within the context of fact-based investigation, with no underlying motive of political advocacy or incitement.

The tone and nature of the questions posed by the victim(s) with complete political neutrality are shaped by the trauma, abuse, and ongoing or past acts of torture they have endured. Similarly, the tone and inquiries of the former Iranian police officer stem from his firsthand exposure to the inner workings of a fully authoritarian regime with complete political neutrality.

In contrast, the author's perspective and line of questioning reflect a position of complete political neutrality, coupled with a personal sense of disbelief, moral concern, and analytical detachment. At no point throughout this book is there any intention of revenge, retaliation, or dishonesty in any form.

This work is fundamentally driven by a humanitarian purpose: to warn the international community and help protect innocent individuals who are at risk or already suffering under repressive systems.

By maintaining full independence from political affiliations, this book seeks to offer a neutral and credible perspective—one that serves the public interest without compromising ethical or factual integrity.

Any political exploitation of this work by any individual or group is not endorsed by the author, the publisher, the former Iranian police officer, or the victim referenced in this book. None of the

abovementioned individuals or legal entities shall bear any responsibility for such use or interpretation under any circumstances.

This declaration is made in full transparency and good faith, with the sole intention of safeguarding the ethical integrity and public value of this publication.

Throughout various sections of this book—particularly in the case study chapters—names of individuals, organizations, or political entities are mentioned. These references are presented with complete neutrality and without any endorsement, opposition, or alignment. The examination of these subjects is limited solely to the political nature of the issued INTERPOL Red Notices. No judgment is made regarding whether the individuals or entities mentioned have committed any other crimes beyond the scope of this analysis.

The author, the witness, and the victim do not confirm nor deny any good or bad actions, alleged crimes, political stances, or accusations of misconduct related to the individuals, institutions, or organizations mentioned in this book. They remain entirely unaffiliated with, and do not align themselves in any way with, any of these persons or entities.

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Introduction

In a world where borders have blurred and exile has become the modern form of escaping dictatorship, a silent yet calculated threat lurks behind those who seek freedom. It doesn't come in the form of border guards or agents with concealed faces—but through international institutions adorned with polished logos and names meant to represent justice and law.

And at the centre of this growing concern stands one of the most recognisable names in international policing: INTERPOL.

An organization that was meant to be a neutral tool in the fight against cross-border crime has, in reality, become a silent weapon in the hands of regimes seeking to silence dissent far beyond their borders. From the Islamic Republic of Iran to others, Interpol has been repeatedly misused to legitimize political persecution, track dissidents abroad, and orchestrate their arrest or return.

Introduction

This book begins with a single document—a formal letter sent from a national Interpol bureau to another, filled with fabricated accusations aimed not at justice, but at repression. But that letter is only a starting point.

Here you will read the stories of individuals who were targeted not because they were criminals, but because they spoke out. Some were arrested. Some were forced into silence. Some were returned to countries where they faced torture, sham trials, and even execution.

These are not rumours or conspiracy theories. They are real cases—documented, verified, and undeniable.

Yet this book is not just about a single nation. It is a warning to the world. When global justice becomes a tool for political vengeance, silence no longer protects the innocent— it endangers them.

Welcome to a world where the hunt begins... in the name of law.

Chapter 1

The Definition of INTERPOL

What is Interpol?

Interpol itself describes its identity in the following way, according to its official website:

The International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol, is the world's largest international policing body, with 195 member countries. Headquartered in Lyon, France, it does not have its own law enforcement agents or powers of arrest.

Instead, Interpol provides a secure platform for cooperation and coordination between national police forces, offering support through its databases, communication tools, and notices. Among its most recognised tools is the Red Notice—a request to locate and provisionally detain a person pending extradition.

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Crucially, Interpol's Constitution—specifically Article 3—prohibits the organization from engaging in any activities of a political, military, religious, or racial nature. Despite this clear mandate, concerns have increasingly arisen over the misuse of Interpol's systems by certain regimes to pursue political targets beyond their borders.

Its role is strictly limited to facilitating international police cooperation, while respecting the sovereignty of each member state and adhering to international legal standards.

Another View on INTERPOL

As stated by the former officer within Iran's police force:

Yet, from my perspective, the reality of Interpol is defined in very different terms:

“INTERPOL may appear to be a neutral platform—a club of cooperating police forces. But when misused, it becomes something else entirely: a tool of transnational repression.”

In its formal definition, an international police agency. It possesses no independent police officers, no prisons, and no authority to arrest individuals on its own. Each of its member states operates a National Central Bureau (NCB), which serves as that country's liaison with Interpol. In the case of Iran, the NCB falls directly under the

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jurisdiction of the International Police Division of the Islamic Republic's Law Enforcement Command.

These national offices are the channels through which all Interpol communications and Red Notice requests are submitted and processed. However, in many countries, these NCBs are overseen by domestic intelligence or internal security services. As a result, Interpol's operations are inherently intertwined with the national security infrastructure of its member states.

Transparency within Interpol has long been a subject of criticism. The organization's internal decision-making processes, the list of active Red Notices, and the criteria for issuing or reviewing them are often shielded from public view.

Individuals targeted by Red Notices frequently report that they are denied access to their own case files, and that no formal explanation is given as to why they have been flagged. The process of challenging or removing a Red Notice is slow, opaque, and often entangled in bureaucratic red tape. For many victims, this lack of transparency becomes a secondary form of punishment, compounding the damage already inflicted by the notice itself.

Equally concerning is the widespread misuse of Interpol by authoritarian regimes. Countries such as Iran and others have repeatedly used Interpol to pursue political opponents and dissidents

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living abroad. In many such cases, Red Notices are issued without meaningful scrutiny, allowing politically motivated charges to be legitimized on an international platform.

In light of these practices, it is reasonable to argue that Interpol, despite its claims of neutrality, often functions more like a coordination platform for national police forces—a closed circle where law enforcement agencies from various regimes exchange sensitive information with limited oversight and almost no external accountability.

And yet, according to its constitution, Interpol is meant to remain apolitical and independent from any religious, military, or political interference. This contradiction between its stated mission and its observable practices lies at the heart of many of the challenges faced by those targeted through its mechanisms.

No Political Affiliation

Why speak out now? Why bring to light a pattern that so many would rather keep in the dark?

The witness, reflecting on years of silence and fear, finally said:

To begin with, I must say this: I now stand in the final stage of a life marked by relentless pursuit and escape—finally in a safe country—

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watching to see whether justice truly exists, or whether it is only a myth.

I have two reasons for choosing to speak the truth.

First, having served for many years in Iran’s police force, specifically within its highest criminal investigation ranks, I had direct access to senior officials—including the Chief of Police of Iran, the head of Tehran Police, and the Director of INTERPOL-Iran. I am fully familiar with the inner workings of the regime’s security doctrine, its religious extremism, and its systemic mechanisms for repression.

I know with certainty that no reform—no matter how seemingly genuine—can change the core nature of the Iranian regime. Its political structure, legal codes, and law enforcement strategies are fundamentally incompatible with international human rights standards.

I have no hope for internal change, and for that reason, I believe it is essential to inform the people of Iran and the world—as well as human rights organizations and even INTERPOL itself—about the dangers of enabling authoritarian regimes.

When international mechanisms are handed over blindly to unjust courts, extremist states, corrupt governments, and politicized police

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agencies, the result is catastrophic. These channels become tools of oppression, not justice.

Second, I feel the responsibility to issue a direct and urgent warning to the leaders, decision-makers, and administrators of INTERPOL:

Every moment of silence or resistance to change—when it comes to regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran—can result in the suffering, torture, or death of one person, ten people, hundreds, or even thousands.

Each delay and hesitation not only violates the core principles of human rights but also risks dragging INTERPOL into political and even military entanglements that stand in clear violation of its Constitution.

In doing so, INTERPOL betrays not just its founding mission—but also the countless victims across the world who believed it stood for justice, not repression.

He struggled to hold back this final sentence—yet it seemed as though he had made a promise to himself to speak with absolute honesty.

He then added a deeply thought-provoking statement:

“You must either accept the world as it is or fight to change it. That fight may cost you dearly—but it is still a choice. If I can prevent

even one life from being ruined, or spark even the smallest reform within the INTERPOL system, then this struggle will have been worth it.”

Q: Why didn't you or the victim speak out while still serving in military or police positions within the system?

He smiled faintly before replying:

Your question reminds me of a quote by **Naguib Mahfouz**, the renowned Egyptian novelist and writer, who once said:

“Home is not where you are born; it is where all your attempts to escape cease.”

That sentence means a lot to me. When "home" becomes a place ruled by fear and suppression, silence turns into a tool for survival.

The answer to that question is painfully obvious. Had I chosen to speak out during my years of service in Iran's police force, I would almost certainly have faced severe torture—possibly execution—given what I know about the inner structure of Iran's security apparatus and military institutions. Even my family would not have been safe.

The harm inflicted by the regime on those who dare to dissent is irreparable—especially when the dissenter comes from within the

system.

It is also worth noting that throughout my years of service, I submitted multiple resignation requests and consistently refused to participate in military standby operations related to protest suppression. As a result, I was prosecuted in several military tribunals—cases for which I hold substantial documentation. However, due to the risk of compromising my identity, I am unable to present these materials here. That said, I remain fully willing to submit them to a legitimate and impartial international court upon formal request.

The same applies to the victim discussed in this book. At the time of their service, speaking out would have resulted in severe consequences—not only for them, but also for their loved ones.

The Fear Behind the Words

Q: Were you hesitating to say this? Were you about to censor that last sentence?

He paused briefly—then answered with quiet candour:

Well, I suppose that hesitation comes from a lifetime shaped by Iranian culture, childhood experiences, and deep-seated fears. In Iran, especially among older generations, it is common never to speak one's mind directly. People often conceal their real feelings—like staying silent instead of saying they're hurt. The younger generations are thankfully more open and honest now, but mine was raised under

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the shadow of tradition—tradition deeply fused with religious extremism.

I am part of the generation that grew up during the Iran–Iraq war, inside a rigid, religious society where even at the age of twenty, I had to ask my parents for permission to take a leisure trip. Ironically, if the trip was for pilgrimage or work, no permission was needed—and I’d even be praised for it.

We learned to hide what we truly thought or felt—at home, in public, and even in ourselves. Self-censorship became part of our survival. So, unlearning it takes time. But I’m consciously working to change that every day.

And still—speaking this truth comes with fear. I know full well that in the eyes of a regime with vast financial reach, I may now become a moving target. I come from within that system. I know that when it comes to critics, there is no mercy—at least not real mercy. If there appears to be, it is either performative or reserved for those critics who belong to them.

I must also admit—I don’t fully trust even you. That’s part of the fear too. And let me be clear: I am not affiliated with any exiled political factions, prominent dissident figures, or anti-regime organizations. I stand entirely alone. I have no backing.

Staying Independent

Q: It's also curious to me—why would someone as intelligent and experienced as you, with a remarkable record in solving high-profile criminal cases, have no connection with any of the well-known opposition groups against the Iranian regime? Can you explain that?

He, who tends to answer the questions he likes with a slight smile, responded in this way:

Well, what I say is entirely personal opinion. I have never been involved in politics, yet I know the things I speak of inevitably intersect with it.

In my view, a significant number of so-called opposition groups are, in fact, creations of the regime itself—designed to control dissent, distract attention, or identify real threats.

As for the remainder—those who are genuinely opposed to the regime—I must say, many have not thought seriously about what happens after the fall. Even if their intentions are pure and their paths righteous, they seem unprepared for what comes next.

Among all known figures, the most credible and strategically prepared appears to be Prince Reza Pahlavi—yet the Islamic Republic, through its far-reaching financial influence and strategic infiltration within both opposition circles and democratic nations, has

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managed to constrict his political space so severely that even those who consider themselves the most patriotic treat him with indifference or unwarranted disdain.

Of course, history must not overlook the foundational infrastructure established by his grandfather, Reza Shah the Great, and his father, Mohammad Reza Shah—an infrastructure from which both the Iranian people and the current authoritarian regime continue to benefit to this day.

Nevertheless, while Prince Reza Pahlavi has repeatedly emphasized—and even in one of his interviews referenced examples such as the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, the republic of France, the constitutional monarchy of Sweden, and the republic dictatorship of Gaddafi—that the structure of Iran’s future government, whether monarchical, republican, or otherwise, is of secondary importance, and that what truly matters is the content and functionality of that government, I fully agree with this perspective. Like him, I too believe that one of the deepest challenges facing Iran lies within its own society: a culture rooted in personality cults, authoritarian tolerance, and idolization of figures, rather than the strengthening of democratic institutions. This is not merely a political problem—it is a behavioural and cultural pattern that requires fundamental transformation.

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Like him, I also share the belief that lasting political and social freedom can only emerge after a genuine cultural shift. The mere possession of voting rights, absent social maturity and cultural responsibility is ultimately meaningless. It will only lead to the recycling of the same authoritarian cycles under a new guise. Without such change, Iranians—whether under a monarchy or a republic—will remain vulnerable to deviation and the repetition of history.

Yet despite this clear-eyed perspective, what we witness today is deeply troubling. Even in free and democratic countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and parts of Europe, there are Iranians who continue to support the Islamic Republic. In response to youth-led protests inside Iran, we have seen pro-regime rallies held abroad—some of which have drawn even larger crowds than the demonstrations they opposed. In some cases, participants in these rallies not only expressed support for the regime but also engaged in verbal and physical confrontations with dissidents.

This harsh reality reveals that the national will and cultural readiness required for a genuine regime change are still lacking. Without this collective maturity, structural political change may be possible, but a real transformation in the nation's destiny remains unlikely. In my view, the Iranian people are not yet ready for a true democratic transition. Perhaps they do not even wish to be ready.

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Furthermore, as someone who has worked inside the system and knows its inner workings intimately, I can say with certainty that the collapse of this regime will not be simple, nor purely the result of popular uprising. It is impossible without strong and comprehensive support from Western countries. Yet even if such support were to materialize, we must understand that the Islamic Republic will not relinquish power easily. Based on what I know from inside the system, when faced with genuine threat, they will either push Iran toward fragmentation and destruction or leave behind a broken and helpless people. They will not fight for ideology—but for survival. And given the scale and documentation of their ongoing human rights abuses, they know all too well that if the regime falls, there will be no safe place for them anywhere in the world.

However, I wish to offer a historical reflection on the Islamic Republic's persistent efforts to retrieve its political opponents from abroad. This pattern of extraterritorial repression, rooted in the earliest days of the revolution, reveals the regime's enduring obsession with silencing dissent beyond its borders. This also applies to the regime's forceful and unilateral use of international engagements to achieve its political objectives. As we say in Persian: "If the architect lays the first brick crooked, the wall will rise crooked to the very end." A flawed foundation ensures a flawed outcome—no matter how high the structure rises.

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One of the earliest and most telling examples of the Islamic Republic's foundational approach to extraterritorial repression was its demand for the extradition of Mohammad Reza Shah following the 1979 revolution. When the former monarch entered the United States for medical treatment, Iran's new regime swiftly requested his return to face prosecution for alleged crimes committed during his rule. Upon rejection of this request—on legal and humanitarian grounds—the regime resorted to a now-familiar tactic: political hostage-taking. On November 4, 1979, so-called “students of the Imam's line” stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days. Their primary demand was the extradition of the Shah. This act of transnational coercion, justified as revolutionary justice, marked the inception of a strategy that has since become institutionalized: the use of hostage diplomacy and international pressure to pursue political goals beyond Iran's borders. This was not merely a reaction—it was the beginning of a state doctrine. A doctrine that the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to follow to this day—one that has not only remained unchanged, but has evolved through the opportunistic misuse of international instruments such as INTERPOL. By exploiting the unintended cooperation of these global mechanisms, the regime has gained increased power, operational speed, and a hollow yet seemingly legitimate legal justification for its transnational repression. It was not merely a reaction—it was a blueprint.

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I'm convinced that the Islamic Republic has extensive contingency plans in place for regime collapse. These plans are designed to reinstall the same figures under a different mask, to maintain control through rebranded forms of power.

How will the opposition stop that? They don't seem to have a clear, actionable plan.

In addition, they lack a defined leadership structure and any true sense of unity. Their actions are fragmented, and they have failed to present a genuine and cohesive grassroots vision for the people. The only individual who possesses both the intellectual and practical qualifications—as well as the necessary political capital—to lead a genuine revolution is Prince Reza Pahlavi. Yet, regrettably, he not only lacks support from many segments of the opposition, but is also actively targeted and undermined by them.

A revolution inevitably comes at great financial and human cost. If this cost must be borne, it should be for the sake of future generations—never for the benefit of a particular group or political figure. That is why I refuse to blindly follow any party or movement merely based on media narratives or popular sentiment. I will not lend my voice or efforts to those whose objectives may place the lives and resources of my people at risk. And I hope you do not forget, throughout this conversation, that I once became a police officer to

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serve and protect my people—defending them against real, tangible threats to their lives and livelihoods.

However, if one day I come across an individual who truly possesses a sound, realistic, and well-structured plan—not just an idealistic vision—I would not hesitate to collaborate with them honestly and to the best of my ability.

Q: In your view, what must happen—socially, culturally, or politically—for real change to become possible in Iran?

A: Iranian society today has become increasingly complex—perhaps dangerously so. I have encountered individuals who, on one hand, actively support my efforts to expose the crimes of the regime, and on the other, secretly trade my information with the regime itself. The same individual might spontaneously join street protests in Tehran, confronting security forces with extraordinary courage, yet remain deeply entangled in contradictory loyalties.

This duality is not just troubling—it is perilous. Many Iranians today seem to harbour two opposing ideologies within a single identity. One side is disillusioned with religion and desperate for freedom; the other is deeply religious, sometimes violently so, embracing forms of extremism and state violence in the name of faith. These extremes coexist within the same person.

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Such psychological duality stands in stark contrast to the values of an ideal society. It not only impedes progress—it signals a dangerous regression. I still cannot fully determine whether this condition is a kind of sociocultural illness that has gripped the nation, or if it is simply the natural result of decades of cultural trauma and ideological manipulation within the Iranian environment.

Real change cannot occur in a society where internal contradiction is the norm and trust is a rare commodity. Social cohesion, cultural integrity, and political vision must all be rebuilt from the ground up.

I must also clarify that I have no personal interest in politics. My disinterest stems from a deeply rooted belief:

“That ordinary people of the Middle East have always been the sacrificial pawns in political games—never the beneficiaries. At least, that has been the case for as long as we have known.

That’s why I remain independent. I do not wish to empower one form of oppression to replace another.”

Chapter 2

The Illusion of Legitimacy

Legal Power as a Weapon

Q: How Do Authoritarian States Abuse Official International Channels?

The former officer described the process in detail:

In the realm of authoritarian regimes, the pursuit of dissent does not stop at domestic borders. It expands, evolves, and takes on new forms—most notably through the misuse of legal systems and international cooperation mechanisms. The most effective weapon in this silent war is not a gun or a prison cell; it is a legitimate-looking document, processed through official institutions, that disguises political persecution as lawful justice.

Iran's Fabricated Justice

One of the most telling examples can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In Iran, political dissidents are frequently targeted by fabricated criminal cases, constructed not through transparent legal procedures, but via opaque commands from intelligence units. These cases often begin with vague or absurd charges such as 'espionage,' 'threats to national security,' or 'affiliation with hostile groups'—phrases that carry heavy legal weight but lack substantive proof.

From Politics to Crime

In recent years, however, the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have shown a shift in strategy—moving away from the more predictable charges of espionage or national security threats. Instead, they have adopted more conventional and socially stigmatizing accusations such as fraud, embezzlement, forgery, sexual assault, abuse of trust, or even moral corruption.

This strategic shift in charge designations by the Islamic Republic was not incidental.

It was a direct response to the international backlash triggered by earlier Red Notices—particularly those based on vague and politically charged allegations. Over the past decades, Iran had

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developed a pattern of labeling its critics with offences such as “disturbing public opinion,” “endangering national security,” or “moral corruption.” However, following a series of scandals and global criticism directed at INTERPOL for entertaining such politically loaded requests, the organization gradually began to exercise more caution.

During a two- to three-year period, many of Iran’s politically motivated submissions were either ignored or received with heightened scrutiny. Once the regime realised this emerging resistance, it adapted. Iranian authorities opted for a new tactic: to construct criminal cases that, while still fabricated, appeared far more aligned with conventional criminal justice standards. In cases deemed critical by the regime, this meant leveraging resources from agencies directly under the judiciary, the Central Bank, the police, the Ministry of Interior, and other bodies. Their objective was clear: to lend an aura of legitimacy to charges, enabling smoother acceptance of Red Notice requests.

No longer did the Islamic Republic rely solely on offences that were not recognised as crimes in free societies.

Instead, it began repackaging its persecution in the language of ordinary criminal law. Today, instead of declaring a critic to be guilty of national security violations, the regime might accuse them of

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financial crimes, money laundering, kidnapping, sexual assault, fraud, embezzlement, or theft.

This change served a dual purpose:

First, it avoided the obvious political red flags that had previously drawn international criticism. Second, it created a scenario where host countries—especially those unfamiliar with the regime’s tactics—could perceive the targeted individual as a genuine threat to their own communities. This perception increases the likelihood of detention, denial of social services, or even deportation, regardless of whether the individual holds refugee status or citizenship.

In some cases, the outcome is far more severe.

In countries with looser judicial safeguards or selective application of the law—such as Iran’s neighbouring states—the regime has managed to engineer quiet deportations or even revocations of citizenship. One of Iran’s neighbouring countries with particularly strong diplomatic ties to the regime, for instance, has in some cases stripped individuals of their legal status despite their ancestral ties to the country, often citing political considerations over human rights obligations.

In more democratic states, the process is less overt—but no less damaging.

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Even when extradition is denied, individuals falsely accused by Iran must spend years in legal limbo, battling the long shadow of a Red Notice. The stain of such accusations lingers. Travel is restricted. Professional opportunities vanish. The accused lives in constant fear—not only of detention but of eventual return to the very regime they fled.

Planned Financial Entrapment

Even according to my precise knowledge, over the past decade the Islamic Republic has successfully expanded its reach into the financial and commercial lives of its opponents—and even individuals who have yet to express any explicit dissent but are perceived as potential threats. This strategy involves allocating significant secret budgets to purchase or trade in vehicles, real estate, stocks, foreign currencies, and other assets that monitored or targeted individuals may need to liquidate.

To illustrate more clearly: imagine an individual who has voiced a few quiet or internal criticisms, and who is not yet seen as a serious threat. The regime discreetly allocates a specific budget and assigns trusted operatives to initiate financial transactions with this person. Sometimes, the individual—motivated by Iran's failing commercial markets—is genuinely surprised at how quickly and fairly they were

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able to sell their assets before emigration, never suspecting that regime agents were on the other end of the transaction.

These transactions become especially valuable to the regime years later—when the same individual, having gained a sense of safety in a neighbouring country or a democratic nation, begins to speak out publicly or engage in whistleblowing. At that point, fabricating a criminal case is no longer difficult. The prior financial interactions with regime-linked operatives provide a convenient pretext for building legal accusations.

Polishing Tyranny Legally

To give these charges the illusion of credibility, Iranian authorities channel them through official police systems, particularly the Criminal Investigation Department (CID)—known locally as Police Agahi. By transferring the case to a major city such as Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, or Isfahan, the regime seeks to add procedural weight and formality. Within these branches, a judge or prosecutor (often hand-picked or operating under political pressure) issues a legal warrant.

This warrant, while internally driven by political motives, is drafted and submitted in a format that complies with Interpol's formal requirements.

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What follows is a request for a Red Notice—a global alert issued in the name of international criminal law, but rooted in domestic tyranny.

In appearance, the notice looks no different from one targeting a genuine terrorist, fraudster, kidnapper, trafficker or a real criminal. But in essence, it is a tool used to pursue authors, activists, whistleblowers, journalists, and even regular citizens who have dared to criticize the regime or flee its reach.

The danger here is not just the Red Notice itself. It is The Illusion of Legitimacy that accompanies it.

A system that was meant to foster cross-border cooperation against real crime has instead become a weapon for dictator authoritarian regimes. The legal format of the submission provides a thin layer of respectability—enough to confuse foreign law enforcement, detain an innocent person, or send them into years of legal limbo in exile.

In some cases, even the individuals themselves—having unknowingly engaged in financial dealings with their future accuser—remain unaware for a long time of what has truly happened. They may believe their assets were flawed, or that they had somehow committed an actual offence during a transaction. And that is precisely what the regime intends.

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The Islamic Republic has developed a level of strategy so sophisticated, and has allocated such extensive covert budgets to suppress dissent, that even the victim begins to doubt themselves—let alone the police or judicial authorities of foreign countries.

This chapter explores the inner workings of that machine: how regimes manufacture cases, pass them through 'clean' official channels, and attempt to deceive the world into believing that justice is being served—when in fact, it is being dismantled.

He continued: If we were to reduce the matter to its simplest terms, the process often begins with one individual—someone who, emboldened by courage and a belief in freedom of expression, chooses to speak out about the existence of systemic oppression in Iran. This individual might be located inside the country and, upon becoming a target, realises that arrest by the regime would almost certainly result in the destruction of their life—if not worse. Fearing the consequences, they escape Iran and seek refuge abroad. Alternatively, the person may already be living outside the country and, having gained a sense of safety, begins to publicly expose the regime's abuses.

Soon after, the Iranian government initiates a series of advanced intelligence operations aimed at locating and apprehending the individual. Once authorities determine their whereabouts—typically

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in a foreign country—the case is handed over to a prosecutor or judge, often one working within Iran’s special judiciary units for political or security-related offences. The judicial authority then issues an order requesting the individual’s arrest through Interpol.

However, because the underlying offence is political in nature, Interpol is—by its own constitution—not permitted to process such a case. So, how do Iranian officials circumvent this rule? The answer is both simple and disturbing: they fabricate a case. They summon their operative—the same one previously instructed to engage in financial dealings with the victim—and order them to file a criminal complaint, citing a specific clause in a contract as the legal basis for judicial action. A prosecutor or judge orders the construction of a criminal file. In some cases, no actual file exists at all. Instead, a vague and superficial description—often no more than four lines—is submitted to the Interpol database by Iran’s national Interpol bureau, and a Red Notice is requested.

Q: Does Interpol review these notices at the point of entry?

A: To the best of my knowledge, no.

There is no real-time filter. It is a bureaucratic automation system, and notices are entered into the system as submitted—without immediate scrutiny, especially now that the Iranian regime has

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become adept at choosing the types of charges that are less likely to trigger review. For instance, accusations such as “disturbing public opinion” or “disrupting public order” may draw suspicion due to Iran’s notorious record in that area. But when the charges appear more conventional and apolitical—such as fraudulent transactions, theft, embezzlement, breach of trust, or forgery—oversight is either minimal, systematized, or functionally ineffective.

Turning Systems Against Critics

In many cases, if the targeted individuals are considered strategically valuable by the regime—or are believed to possess extensive or sensitive information—the Iranian authorities intensify their efforts. Through a series of formal letters sent to countries where the individual is suspected to be residing, and by leveraging Interpol’s international systems, they seek to obtain a wide range of private information about the victim.

In effect, Interpol becomes a channel through which authoritarian regimes can access detailed intelligence on their critics—turning an institution designed for transnational cooperation into a surveillance tool for political repression.

Urgency as Political Tactic

In certain cases deemed of high importance by the Iranian regime—particularly when the targeted dissident was once an insider with

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potential access to classified or compromising information—the letters submitted to foreign authorities often include the word **"Urgent"** to convey the alleged seriousness of the matter. This term is strategically employed to give the fabricated criminal charges an artificial sense of gravity, increasing the perceived legitimacy of the request.

By labeling the case as *urgent*, Iranian authorities aim not only to raise the credibility of their submission, but also to instill fear among security officials in the host country. This tactic is designed to prompt swift action, bypassing routine verification protocols.

It must be noted that when the targeted individual is deemed exceptionally important by the Iranian regime—and is either residing in or travelling through one of Iran's neighbouring countries—high-level coordination typically occurs in advance. Senior Iranian officials, including ministers or top-ranking security figures, often establish direct communication with security authorities or even the presidential office of the host country. Only after such coordination is achieved do they initiate the process of issuing a Red Notice, applying the **"Urgent"** label, and launching further operations.

In some instances, the designation of urgency has been sufficient to draw the direct attention of senior officials—occasionally even a

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Minister of Interior or the President of the receiving state—who may then intervene personally in the matter.

Proof of Legal Abuse

In the continuation of this discussion, I will present a document for your review. While I do not authorise its full publication, in order to protect the rights and privacy of potential victims, I am prepared to share the complete material—upon formal request—with internationally recognised human rights organizations or legitimate international courts for thorough examination. That said, I do permit the publication of redacted, non-traceable excerpts from this document.

The document originates from within INTERPOL’s internal system and clearly demonstrates both the strategic use of the term “Urgent” and the broad scope of personal data requested by the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding a targeted individual.

It contains an official communication from Iran’s National Central Bureau (NCB) to NCBs in several neighbouring countries, calling not only for the pursuit, arrest, and extradition of a whistleblower and outspoken critic of the regime, but also for the transfer of highly sensitive personal data—such as the individual’s residential address, identification or passport details issued by other states (in cases of

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dual or multiple citizenship), and even their flight records and destination if they have already left the country in question.

This document serves as concrete and verifiable evidence of how fabricated charges are meticulously constructed to increase pressure and elicit cooperation from foreign authorities—under the false pretense of lawful urgency.

This is only one among thousands of letters the Iranian regime sends each year to INTERPOL branches in foreign countries.

A System Built for Abuse

But it raises a fundamental question:

Why should such an option even exist for an authoritarian regime like Iran—one that allows access to sensitive and personal information without a fair trial, or even a valid court ruling, in the country where the individual resides?

Regardless of whether the targeted person is guilty of an actual crime or not, the very existence of this system undermines the private rights of individuals under international law and poses a direct threat to the legal sovereignty of any host country.

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More alarmingly, this tool can become a weapon against dissidents and protesters of authoritarian regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Iranian regime has a well-documented history of assassinating its opponents abroad.

Transferring such sensitive information to its intelligence services can, in some cases, lead directly to the physical elimination of targeted individuals.

On the following page, the referenced document can be clearly reviewed. It is important to note that, in order to protect the victim from further harm or retaliation, specific portions of the letter containing sensitive personal information have been blacked out. However, the former Iranian police officer affirms full readiness to present the complete, unredacted version of the document to any legitimate international authority or court, should it be required.

This image unveils not only the behind-the-scenes coordination between the Iranian regime's police and other countries through the INTERPOL system, but also marks the starting point of one of the most significant cases of recent decades—and of this very book.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ncb.tehran [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Urgent
IP Tehran
IP [REDACTED]
Our ref: [REDACTED]
Your ref: [REDACTED]
Subject; Iranian National; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Dear colleagues;
Please be advised that the subject is wanted by our judicial authorities [REDACTED]
As [REDACTED] can be located in your country please take necessary measures to arrest and extradite the subject to our country and let us know the result
In case [REDACTED] left your country please provide us with his flight details and destination country.
If you have any information about his non-Iranian passports or ID documents, providing us with the data will be highly appreciated.
[REDACTED]
Best regards,
Interpol Tehran
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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The original document was disclosed to the Victim through a lawful judicial procedure outside of Iran. Its publication is authorised for the sole purpose of transparency, documentation, and public awareness regarding patterns of international misuse.

Not the Accused—The Witness

Q: Where did you obtain this document?

A: I am aware of this case as someone who has personally witnessed the experience of one of the victims of Iran's misuse of INTERPOL—not as a party to the case myself. I have been granted full permission by the victim to share and publish the document for the purposes of public awareness and documentation. In this case, I am not the subject—I am the witness.

This letter was disclosed to the victim by the judicial system of the host country—following the victim's repeated complaints and persistent legal efforts against the national security apparatus of a democratic state in which he resided. The document came to light after the security services failed to respond adequately to judicial inquiries, prompting a senior prosecutor from a high court to intervene due to the gravity of the case.

It is worth noting that during my years of service within Iran's police force, I came across several similar multi-page letters submitted

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through INTERPOL channels, all bearing the same intent: to track, pressure, and ultimately endanger those who dared to speak out.

“What follows are two revelations so critical—and so implausible—that they challenge the very foundations of what we assume about international justice.”



Chapter 3

Shadow Deals Behind Courts

The Judicial Void in Global Systems

Q: Can INTERPOL or the international police force of any given country, arrest or extradite someone without internal judicial coordination?

Q: Does INTERPOL possess international judicial authority?

Q: Is it even legally permissible for INTERPOL to act as a coordinating body for arrest, transfer, or extradition without the involvement of a national court?

He responded with a bitter smile, as though the question had reopened an old wound—but still, he answered:

These questions strike at the heart of one of the most overlooked yet dangerous loopholes in global law enforcement. While INTERPOL

itself is not a judicial body and lacks any power to arrest or try individuals, its notices—especially the infamous Red Notices—can set off a chain of events that bypass national legal systems entirely.

In theory and law any action taken based on an INTERPOL notice must be reviewed and approved by the judicial authorities of the country involved.

Informal Power Over Formal Process

In practice, however, authoritarian regimes often sidestep this process by forging informal deals with security bodies or even directly pressuring immigration and border control units. Thus, what should be a matter of law becomes a matter of politics—and in some cases, corruption.

The answer to all these questions, under the laws of most INTERPOL member states include Iran's neighbouring countries, is a clear and resounding **NO**.

And yet, the fact that INTERPOL allows regimes to exploit its systems for corrupt purposes raises deeply troubling questions.

A Short Letter, A Long Impact

This letter may consist of just a few lines, but it exposes a significant void in the structure of global justice.

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It reveals something far more alarming: authoritarian regimes no longer need to rely solely on proxy agents or covert intelligence operatives to track, harass, or silence dissidents, journalists, writers, or political opponents abroad.

All they need now is access to a system—conveniently provided by INTERPOL—through which they can quietly request information or initiate action against their chosen targets.

Information Without Oversight

What must not be forgotten is this: sharing even the smallest piece of information about a suspect residing in another country requires explicit judicial orders from that country's legal authorities.

And this rule applies not only to victims of authoritarian regimes, but also to any and all criminal suspects, regardless of the nature of their alleged offences.

Quiet Influence Across Borders

The systematic hijacking of judicial frameworks in neighbouring and seemingly democratic countries by the Islamic Republic of Iran remains an ongoing reality—quiet, calculated, and disturbingly effective.

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Another critical issue that should deeply concern Iran's neighbouring countries—or any other country—is that this letter constitutes a clear and undeniable request to violate nation sovereignty.

What is even more alarming is that one of Iran's neighbouring countries own security apparatus has chosen to cooperate with this blatant interference and breach of its national sovereignty.

Justice, Slogans, and Reality

It is truly regrettable that in today's world—despite all the grand slogans about justice—dictatorial regimes can still obtain information about their critics from countries that publicly champion the ideals of justice and human rights.

Yet the most troubling question remains: who has provided these regimes with such a blatant and internationally recognised tool for espionage?

The answer, unfortunately, is clear: **INTERPOL**.

An organization that, upon visiting its official website, proclaims its mission as facilitating international police cooperation to **make the world a safer place!**

The personal conclusion I have drawn is this: INTERPOL has provided dictators with a fast, efficient, and highly functional

system—one that allows them to obtain information about their critics even when those critics are living abroad.

Procedure Without Access

Yet when a critic dares to file a complaint and presents themselves as a political target, backed by undeniable evidence and documentation, INTERPOL redirects them to the CCF Commission—an internal body that, almost routinely, refuses to investigate, citing unacceptable excuses such as "budget constraints."

What makes the situation even more concerning is that the CCF itself is bound by a set of rigid protocols that make it virtually impossible for a political victim—or even a top-tier attorney in their own country—to successfully register a case. Most complaints are dismissed right at the outset and never make it past the initial review.

This, in itself, stands in stark contradiction to the very essence of justice. Justice means that when someone declares, "I am a critic, and I am being targeted," that claim must be taken seriously and investigated.

Instead, victims are forced to bear the burden of hiring expensive legal experts who are familiar with INTERPOL's internal mechanisms and know how to navigate these bureaucratic protocols. And that, too, contradicts the idea of justice in the modern world.

Perhaps most troubling of all is the fact that, for years, no meaningful reform or update has been implemented by INTERPOL in this regard. Meanwhile, the surveillance and monitoring systems used to track these same individuals are updated every few months.

Power Pays, Victims Wait

This is a clear example of a deeply troubling reality: a member state that has wealth and influence—and pays the price of participation—receives full cooperation from the system. But victims, those with neither power nor resources, are left without a path forward, locked out of a system that claims to stand for justice.

What remains largely unknown to the general public—and even to most legal professionals—is that certain private-sector companies, including international airlines and booking platforms, have been granted access to INTERPOL's databases through a programme called **I-Checkit**.

Under the banner of security, these companies are allowed to run names and personal data of passengers against INTERPOL's systems, including the SLTD (Stolen and Lost Travel Documents) database and, in some instances, Red Notice alerts.

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The most alarming part of this mechanism is not just the covert nature of the checks, but the complete absence of judicial oversight and lack of informed consent.

For instance, this mechanism poses an acute danger to a political dissident or refugee—someone who has fled a brutal dictatorship and sought asylum in a safe country. The mere registration of their personal data in INTERPOL's databases creates a perilous vulnerability: the same authoritarian regime that once sought to silence or eliminate them through repression now gains silent access to that very information, under the guise of international cooperation.

When an individual purchases an airline ticket, there is no clear indication that their personal data may be screened through international police systems. No warning, no legal notification, no opportunity to contest the process. A person could find themselves flagged, monitored, or even detained—without ever knowing that their name was quietly scanned by a system that claims to operate under the principles of justice.

In a world that often boasts about privacy and procedural fairness, such silent screening of travelers is a deeply troubling contradiction. It reveals how easily surveillance and control mechanisms have seeped into commercial infrastructures—with no legal accountability, no transparency, and no regard for the basic rights of individuals.

Critique, Not Rejection

No one—not even this victim, or the many victims of this system who, along with their families, have endured long-term psychological, emotional, and financial harm—opposes the existence of INTERPOL or the pursuit and arrest of genuinely dangerous individuals.

But what must not be overlooked is this: by placing blind trust in authoritarian regimes, INTERPOL repeatedly violates its own constitution and collaborates with criminal governments, thereby undermining international law.

If this were a one-time error, it might be forgivable. But INTERPOL has, for years, merely watched as these regimes exploited its mechanisms. And when pressured by journalists or international outcry, the organization responds with token gestures—cancelling one Red Notice or issuing a minor procedural update—neither of which has any real impact on how countries like Iran abuse the system.

In my personal view, international human rights bodies must intervene decisively and urgently. What we are witnessing is no longer administrative negligence—it is systemic complicity.

Breaches of Interpol's Core

In the case of this dissident victim of the system, INTERPOL has been in violation of multiple foundational articles of its own Constitution for nearly two years. These violations are not alleged—they are substantiated by comprehensive documentation, submitted both to INTERPOL and to competent judicial authorities:

1. Violation of Article 3 – Strict prohibition of political intervention:

Article 3 of the Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL explicitly states:

“It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”

The Red Notice in question is fundamentally political in nature. Both national and international courts have recognised this, and INTERPOL has been provided with extensive documentation proving that the individual is being targeted solely for public criticism of an authoritarian regime.

2. Violation of the same Article 3 – Prohibition on targeting military or law enforcement personnel for their service roles:

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Although Article 3 is often referenced in the political context, its interpretation has repeatedly been extended—through decisions of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF)—to prohibit the targeting of former military personnel based solely on their professional history in countries such as Iran. In this case, the Red Notice stems directly from the individual’s years of prior service within the Iranian armed forces, combined with later whistleblowing activities. This renders the notice doubly illegal: both politically motivated and in violation of protection granted to ex-security officials.

3. Violation of INTERPOL’s own Rules on the Processing of Data – Specifically Articles 2, 34, and 82 of the RPD:

These rules require that any data, including red notices, must be accurate, relevant, up-to-date, and compliant with international human rights standards and national procedural fairness.

The file submitted by the Iranian authorities lacks basic due process guarantees, contains vague and fabricated charges, and was constructed in an entirely opaque and politically motivated process.

As per Article 34 of the RPD, INTERPOL must ensure that data is “compliant with basic principles of due process.” Yet in this case, the submission was accepted without such

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verification—despite the fact that the flaws were apparent even within the document submitted by Iran. Moreover, the entire legal proceeding was conducted in absentia, and no notice, summons, or formal notification was ever issued or delivered to the victim.

These violations are not abstract or theoretical—they have had real-life consequences, including restrictions on mobility, access to basic services, and psychological trauma endured by both the victim and their family. If the Organization continues to ignore its foundational principles and binding legal obligations, it not only betrays its mission but actively endangers the lives of innocent people.

Timelines That Don't Add Up

How can it be that a serious criminal act was allegedly committed, and yet for years, no one within the Islamic Republic of Iran—despite its vast and intrusive intelligence apparatus—had any awareness of it? This is a country where every movement is monitored, every deviation is documented, and every dissident is watched.

Even more absurd is the fact that the case reportedly includes a private complainant. In criminal cases, particularly those involving financial or physical harm, a private plaintiff would typically become aware of the injury or loss immediately after the incident occurs—not several years later, and certainly not only after the accused has fled the

country and publicly criticized the regime. This implausible timeline further illustrates the politically motivated and retroactive nature of the charges, reinforcing the violation of due process as outlined in INTERPOL's RPD framework.

What makes the situation even more striking is this: neither the victim nor any member of their immediate family—whether during their time in Iran or in any of the foreign countries where they resided—has ever committed even the smallest legal infraction. They do not have so much as a traffic violation on their records.

The victim, even as of today, remains fully capable of obtaining a clean criminal background certificate from Iran as well as from all other foreign countries of residence.

Embedded Power Players

Q: And who exactly are the alleged plaintiffs in this case?

He replied:

That, in fact, is the most revealing part. Through the victim's own investigation and the help of several trusted contacts still inside Iran, it was discovered that one of the main plaintiffs is a person with direct financial ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He has been involved in operations such as money laundering and large-scale land seizures for the IRGC and has been sentenced to prison

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multiple times by independent judicial authorities in Iran—only to be released each time through intervention by security officials. His criminal record is extensive and well-documented.

Another plaintiff is a high-ranking Iranian military commander who has been deeply involved in massive financial transactions with Iranian intelligence agencies. A third is one of the key suppliers of raw materials for construction projects run by IRGC-affiliated engineering bases. And yet another is an employee of a known Iranian security institution.

These plaintiffs once again demonstrate how the Iranian regime strategically embeds its trusted agents into the financial and commercial lives of individuals it deems as potential threats—long before any actual dissent occurs. The objective is clear: to quietly gather leverage, so that when the time is right, those individuals can be targeted—either through domestic prosecution or international harassment.

Now, this raises a serious question: how could the victim, an individual with no political backing or institutional power, have allegedly harmed such powerful figures? And if actual harm was caused, why did it take them years to realise it? Why didn't they notice anything at the time the alleged events supposedly took place?

Another fundamental question must be asked: If the victim truly posed a threat to such powerful individuals and organizations within the Iranian regime, why was their departure from the country not prevented—especially given that it occurred through entirely legal channels? With the extensive control that Iran’s intelligence and border systems exert over all exits from the country, it is difficult to believe that such a departure could go unnoticed unless it was not considered a threat at the time—or unless the case had not even been fabricated yet.

Criticism Equals Treason in The Eyes of Regime

Q: Does the Iranian regime view you or the victim as a spy or enemy, and is that why it holds such deep hostility toward you?

He paused briefly—just enough to make it clear that the question carried weight. Then, with a faint, bitter smile, he replied:

At the time of the victim’s legal departure from Iran—and even now—I possess firsthand knowledge that the individual holds detailed information about the country’s most sensitive security centres, its most vulnerable defence points, and its internal systems for electronic surveillance, weapons depots, and the armaments used by the regime. These are not scattered facts—they constitute a full and operational framework which, if revealed, could seriously compromise the Iranian government through a meticulously executed

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operation. It is not difficult to imagine that, in today's geopolitical landscape, such strategic knowledge—if placed in the wrong hands—could become the target of intense interest by foreign intelligence services. The potential consequences of any disclosure are severe, yet the victim or me has never sought to exploit or disclose any part of this knowledge.

Despite the sensitivity of the information in question, neither the victim nor I have ever considered using it—either directly or indirectly—for any personal, political, or strategic advantage. Our guiding principle has always been that such knowledge does not belong to any political faction or regime, but to the land itself—to Iran and its people. We firmly believe that matters of national security should never be weaponized or exposed in ways that could harm civilians or destabilize the country. That is why these facts have been—and will always remain—undisclosed.

Tragically, however, the regime's security structure is built on ignorance and brute force. If you examine its founders and current operation, you will find a dangerously binary worldview: you are either with the regime—or you are against it.

Within this system, regime loyalists stand above the law. They commit crimes openly and with impunity—sometimes so brazenly

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that even state-run media cannot ignore them. They violate rights, steal from public resources, and abuse others with little consequence.

Meanwhile, anyone who dares to criticize the system—whether an officer like myself who once served the people, or a whistleblower like the victim, or even an ordinary citizen—is instantly branded a traitor or foreign agent. In this warped mindset, dissent equals treason. And those who dissent are dealt with swiftly and brutally.

You hear about executions nearly every week, but what the public sees is only the tip of the iceberg. These are the cases where friends or family of the victim had enough courage to go public. The true numbers are far higher.

And then there are what I can only describe as “**Silent Executions**”—cases so covert and intentionally hidden that even people inside Iran remain unaware they ever happened. In some instances, not even the victim’s family is informed—left instead in an eternal silence, wondering why their loved one never returned.

Iran’s Silent Executions

Q: I know this might not directly align with the subject of this interview, but if you don’t mind, could you provide more information about the so-called silent executions in Iran?

He paused briefly, his face turning red, then said:

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I don't like to further darken the image of my homeland in the eyes of the world. But yes—I believe it is important that both my people and international human rights organizations are fully aware of these facts.

To the best of my knowledge, there are four distinct types of silent executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran:

1. The Publicly Known but Socially Silenced Execution:

This type is common. Both the friends and family of the accused are fully aware that their loved one is imprisoned due to dissent or political protest. The person is later executed, often under charges like 'enmity against God' or 'treason against the Islamic Revolution.' Sometimes, the family is granted a final visit. Yet, for reasons ranging from deep religious beliefs to fear of public shame or social backlash, the family refuses to make the matter public or pursue justice.

2. The Protest-Era Killings Disguised as Clashes:

These executions occur during mass protests. The regime either shoots protesters on the streets or kills them during interrogations in local intelligence stations. The state consistently blames such killings on so-called foreign-backed 'terrorist groups' or 'anti-revolutionary elements.' In more extreme situations, when the regime feels genuinely threatened, plainclothes officers or rooftop snipers are deployed to execute protesters in public. Tragically, even children

have not been spared in recent years, as authorities try to pacify the streets by deliberately targeting children or young individuals.

3. The Engineered “Accidents” and Disappearances:

This is by far the most prevalent method. A relatively unknown critic or protester, who doesn’t have a significant public profile, is killed in a ‘traffic accident,’ a staged ‘overdose,’ a suspicious ‘fire,’ or during a fake ‘street brawl.’ These deaths are orchestrated to seem like unfortunate but natural incidents. The regime avoids any liability, and even if the victim’s family becomes suspicious, they often choose silence—knowing full well that no solid evidence remains.

4. Disappearances Followed by Secret Executions:

This method has become alarmingly common in recent years. When a regime critic is identified by Iranian intelligence for the first time—and deemed a potential threat from the outset—the response is swift and merciless. The individual is abducted without warning, often while commuting to work or taking a walk, forcibly shoved into an unmarked vehicle and vanished without a trace.

Their family, unaware of the true nature of what has occurred, typically files a missing person report with the Iranian police. At this point, the Ministry of Intelligence immediately intervenes, instructing the Criminal Investigations Department (Police Agahi) to drop the

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case. The goal is simple: erase the paper trail and ensure that no official documentation reaches the victim's relatives.

In some cases, the individual is held for years in undisclosed detention facilities—interrogated, tortured, and eventually executed without trial. In others, the execution occurs shortly after the abduction. The most chilling detail? Their bodies are deliberately destroyed to eliminate all physical evidence of the crime.

It should be noted that there is, in fact, a fifth category—one that I am unable to disclose at this time due to its complexity and the extremely sensitive nature of the information involved. However, should you be interested in the future, I would be willing to provide further insight. The dark phenomenon of crimes associated with silent executions in Iran demands a comprehensive and dedicated exploration—perhaps through a separate book or an in-depth interview.

With a sorrow that clearly welled up from deep within, he continued:

“And yet, INTERPOL places its trust in a regime that commits such atrocities—and even worse crimes abroad—in pursuit of its corrupt goals?!”

Chapter 4

Hunted in the Shadows

Shadow Files

What follows is more than a mere document—it is a record of targeted injustice...

Q: How Dictators Exploit INTERPOL's Good Faith?

He started to explain with calm, measured patience:

In the continuation of this discussion, I present the English translation of an actual court ruling issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Iran—one that has been acknowledged and accepted as valid evidence by the judicial authorities of another country.

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This document serves as a clear illustration of how political charges are formalized and projected internationally through official legal frameworks.

This document was submitted to INTERPOL's CCF Commission over a year ago—through both electronic channels and direct delivery—by a qualified and licensed attorney representing the victim. Despite the submission being complete and professionally compiled, the review process experienced significant delay, with responses from the CCF remaining vague and without clear timelines. Only after prolonged waiting and repeated follow-ups did the Commission issue a limited procedural update: it acknowledged that the case is under review, and that the Red Notice in question **may be provisionally suspended** pending a full assessment of the file's compliance with INTERPOL rules.

While this update is a welcome step forward, it also reflects a broader issue—that individuals under politically motivated notices may face long periods of uncertainty, during which their legal status remains unclear and their daily lives are marked by fear, stress, and instability.

INTERPOL's procedural delays, whether due to limited resources or administrative backlogs, can unintentionally prolong the suffering of those seeking protection, while affording more time and room for authoritarian states to maintain pressure on their targets.

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Due to the highly confidential nature of this court ruling—and the potential risk it poses to individuals who took great personal risk to obtain and deliver it to the victim—the full document cannot be published within this book.

Instead, in the following pages, only select portions of the ruling that have been officially translated and verified will be presented. These excerpts alone are sufficient to reveal the disturbing depth of injustice embedded within the Iranian legal and judicial system.

To prevent potential misuse or retaliation by the Iranian regime, the victim will only share the unredacted and full version of the ruling directly with legitimate international courts and human rights organizations upon formal request.

It is also worth noting that the full document—along with multiple certified translations—has already been submitted to INTERPOL in its complete, uncensored form.

According to his statement: Also unfortunately, due to explicit restrictions imposed by the governmental body responsible for translating and certifying the ruling, the identity of the translating authority and the official institution that validated the document cannot be disclosed within this publication.

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Their authorization applies strictly to the submission of the ruling to INTERPOL and recognised judicial bodies, and therefore, their identifying details have been **intentionally omitted** from the materials presented here.

He continued: I see no need to elaborate beyond the crime already evident in this ruling. By reading it, you can clearly discern the extent of the deceptive operations orchestrated within Iran's governmental and state-run institutions to justify the victim forced return.

The contents of this ruling speak more clearly than any explanation could. (Next Pages)

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TRANSLATION

TOP SECRET

Judicial Authority
Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Islamic Revolutionary and Public Prosecutor's Office
FINAL DECISION

In The Name of God

Islamic Revolutionary and Public Prosecutor's Office -

Subject:

1- According to the information protection report of the [REDACTED], the mentioned person, after [REDACTED] attempted to write a book titled [REDACTED] themed on the lack of respect for citizens' rights in the country's [REDACTED] agencies [REDACTED], specifically regarding the lack of respect for women's rights in [REDACTED] organizations. According to the decision of the Honorable Judge of Branch [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Public Prosecutor's Office and the approval of the Honorable Judge of Branch [REDACTED] Court of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, [REDACTED] holding national identification [REDACTED] has been sentenced to execution by hanging. Therefore, in order to be included in the system and for the application of Islamic law, it is declared that he has committed the crime of betrayal against the Islamic Revolution.

2- According to the information protection report of the [REDACTED] Prosecution Office for [REDACTED], the aforementioned person, after [REDACTED] shared [REDACTED] videos on [REDACTED] platform regarding the non-compliance with citizens' rights within the country's [REDACTED]. The Honorable Judge of Branch [REDACTED] Crimes Court of the Islamic Revolution of [REDACTED] Iran, Judge of the said branch, ruled that [REDACTED] holding national identification [REDACTED] be sentenced [REDACTED] years of imprisonment and execution by hanging. [REDACTED] has been sentenced to imprisonment and hanging by rope due to the crime of betrayal against the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, the matter has been registered in the system and notified for the purpose of applying Shari'a punishment.

3- According to the latest report obtained from the passport and immigration police of [REDACTED] Airport, considering that the aforementioned person most recently departed the country with the intention of going [REDACTED], coordination with Interpol police as explained below is required for his extradition.

A) According to the coordination of the Honorable Prosecutor of the [REDACTED] Office of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a case must be filed against the convict at the [REDACTED] Department for Combating [REDACTED] under the title of [REDACTED].

B) In line with the coordination of the Honorable Prosecutor of the [REDACTED] Office of the Islamic Revolution, the file must be sent to the [REDACTED] Investigation Branch of the General and Revolutionary Prosecution Office of District [REDACTED].

C) The respected investigator of the [REDACTED] Branch of the [REDACTED] Prosecutor's Office of the General and Revolutionary Prosecution Office of District [REDACTED] must issue an arrest warrant and [REDACTED] year prison sentence for the crime of [REDACTED].

D) The situation must be reported to the [REDACTED] International Police (Interpol) for an unlimited detention period. Z) The current situation concerning [REDACTED] amounting to approximately [REDACTED] USD ([REDACTED] Rials) must be declared to the international police system (Interpol).

H) Since the International Police (Interpol) does not deal with political crimes, no information indicating that the mentioned person committed a political crime shall be recorded in the police system.

Y) It must be stated that a case under the title [REDACTED] has been secretly filed at the [REDACTED] Police Department for [REDACTED] in coordination with the Chief of the [REDACTED] Police. This case file must be forwarded to the competent authorities (International Police) for follow-up regarding the capture and extradition of the convicted individual, so that upon his return, the Shari'a punishment can be applied.

4. The provisions and limits of Shari'a law are to remain completely confidential, and under no circumstances shall they be communicated to the convict, their lawyer, or the family of the convict. It is clear that such Shari'a rulings and punishments must not be entered into or recorded in the judicial system in any manner. Therefore, it is required that the Information Protection Department of the [REDACTED] Office of [REDACTED] notify all recipients in writing and in a sealed envelope.

5. At the discretion of the Honorable Prosecutor of the [REDACTED] Chief Public Prosecutor's Office and the Revolutionary Prosecution Office [REDACTED], the disclosure of [REDACTED] information contained in this decision to the media and the general public must be prevented.

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The information

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- [REDACTED] convict [REDACTED]
6. In order to eliminate the possibility of the convict hiding in foreign countries, procedures related to the case filed against the convict under the title [REDACTED] as well as procedures in other cases related to these crimes, must be carried out as extensively as possible.
7. A statement including an explanatory notification must be issued by the [REDACTED] Police and delivered to the convict.
8. Due to the fact that the aforementioned person has served [REDACTED] years as [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] an order must be issued instructing all his former colleagues to sever any form of contact with him.
9. Considering that the convict's betrayal of the Islamic Revolution is completely clear, [REDACTED] right to appeal has been revoked.

[REDACTED] Branch of the General and Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office [REDACTED] Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office

Signed: [REDACTED]

RECIPIENTS:

1. Information Protection of [REDACTED] Police Forces
2. Information Protection of the Judiciary of [REDACTED]
3. Chief of [REDACTED] Intelligence Police
4. Prosecutor of Branch [REDACTED] the General and Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office, District [REDACTED]
5. Honorable Deputy Head of the [REDACTED] Prosecutor's Office and Islamic Revolution
6. Honorable Judge of Branch [REDACTED] the Prosecution Office for [REDACTED] the Islamic Revolution of Iran
7. Honorable Judge of Branch [REDACTED] the Prosecution Office for [REDACTED] the Islamic Revolution of Iran
8. Chief of International Police (Interpol) of [REDACTED] Police Force
9. Chief of International Police (Interpol) of the Police Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran
10. Chief of [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] of the Islamic Republic of Iran
11. Information Protection of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran
12. General and Revolutionary Chief Prosecutor's Office of [REDACTED]
13. Honorable Prosecutor of [REDACTED] Chief Prosecution Office
14. Information Protection of the Police Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran
15. Information Protection of the Immigration and Passport Police of [REDACTED]
16. Information Protection of the Immigration and Passport Police of the Islamic Republic of Iran

[REDACTED] CERTIFICATION

CERTIFIED TRANSLATION STATEMENT

A Ruling from the Shadows

Q: Given that parts of the ruling have been redacted to protect the victim's identity, could you provide a brief interpretation or summary of its contents?

He responded gently:

“Certainly. Anyone who reads this will understand the nature of the ruling, but for the sake of complete clarity, I will explain it step by step.

According to information obtained from available intelligence sources, for something as limited as the publication of a few videos on social media, and the launch—but not full release—of a book discussing violations of women's and civil rights in Iran, the court imposed multiple sentences: two executions and several years of imprisonment.

The final judgment is both irrevocable and in absentia. It was issued by two specialized branches of Iran's judiciary that routinely handle political dissent and ideological offences, and it was then formally endorsed by the branch responsible for enforcing religious rulings.

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The charges? Treason and enmity against the Islamic Revolution. The verdict also states that the sentence must be carried out as swiftly as possible under Islamic legal procedures.

Up to this point, the ruling might seem familiar—even routine—for Iranian citizens and international human rights observers. Unfortunately, sentences of this nature are not uncommon. They reflect the reality of a regime that has fused its crimes with religion and treats human life as expendable.

But from here, the text takes a turn. Due to the classified nature of this ruling, it is the first time that such an official document has been publicly analysed in this detail.

According to the Iranian Passport Police records, the individual's last recorded international departure was to a neighbouring country. As such, international coordination is deemed necessary for the execution of the verdict and associated actions.

The judge explicitly instructs that the case be reframed as a criminal offence and referred to the relevant criminal investigation department within Iran's law enforcement structure. It is revealed that prior coordination had already occurred with a trusted figure within this department who would file the complaint.

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To make the process appear legitimate, the ruling also specifies that the case must not be sent to a judge known for handling political cases. Instead, it should be assigned to a different judicial officer, one in a separate district typically responsible for criminal matters—someone with whom prior arrangements have already been made.

The goal is clear: reclassify the case as criminal, assign a fabricated financial offence involving large sums of U.S. dollars, and issue an arrest warrant. This approach ensures that the victim is listed internationally as a fugitive wanted for financial crimes—not as a political dissident.

The judge then orders that Iran's INTERPOL liaison must be notified to request an indefinite detention warrant—specifically a Red Notice—through INTERPOL. The fabricated nature of the crime must be concealed at all costs.

The ruling explicitly warns that the political nature of the case must not be disclosed to INTERPOL, as the organization will reject requests targeting political figures.

Additional instructions state that the fabricated criminal case must be presented with professional precision, eliminating any signs of orchestration or inconsistency.

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The victim must only be notified that they are wanted for “clarification” regarding certain matters—without revealing the actual charges.

Given the victim’s prior military service, former colleagues are to be informed that any contact with the individual will be considered as collaboration and punished accordingly.

The ruling concludes by declaring that betrayal of the Islamic Republic has been proven beyond doubt. The judgment is final, binding, and not subject to appeal.

At the bottom of the document, there are sixteen recipients—high-ranking intelligence and security officials—listed for the purpose of coordination.

It is a masterclass in deception, using a forged criminal case to execute what is in reality a political persecution. It shows exactly how state institutions in Iran coordinate seamlessly with police forces and judicial systems to pursue dissidents beyond its borders.”

Justice Delayed, Lives at Risk

Q: Are the delays by the CCF a cause for concern?
He explained, his face visibly burdened:

First, I must tell you that in my opinion—and in the view of many prominent legal experts in this field, the very fact that the CCF is an

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entity affiliated with INTERPOL is a grave structural flaw. It is a flaw that can ultimately endanger lives.

On top of that, the CCF is excruciatingly slow in its operations. Each time, we receive the same response: that the case is under review—often accompanied by excuses about staff shortages or lack of funding.

I do not wish to accuse anyone or any institution, but if I am to speak honestly and based on my personal experience, I have come to the conclusion that the CCF is deliberately prolonging its decisions—either to serve hidden agendas or due to opaque internal policies. This delay—intentional or not—plunges victims into profound distress. Among the consequences are serious psychological trauma, the complete loss of assets accumulated over decades, the physical and emotional suffering of family members, the deterioration of family and social relationships, and many other devastating effects.

He paused for a moment, as though overwhelmed by emotion. After drinking a sip of water, he continued:

In fact, if someone with no legal or security background were to review this case and its supporting evidence, they would likely decide to cancel the Red Notice entirely just by reading the first few pages.

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Given victim background in military and law enforcement, I find it deeply suspicious that legal professionals and CCF reviewers have not reached this same conclusion.

What's more, I have shown the Red Notice to close friends—ordinary people with no legal, police, or judicial expertise. Without me saying a word, their immediate reaction upon reading the document was that it resembled a joke more than an official INTERPOL file. That alone should say everything. The fabrication is self-evident. And yet, no serious action is taken, and with every day we wait for an answer, And with every day that a victim waits in hope for a serious and just response from INTERPOL, it feels as though not only they, but their family—and even their closest friends—age another year.

They are trapped in a life filled with relentless stress and uncertainty over a matter they had no hand in creating.

Unlike a murderer or thief who, whether guilty or not, knows what they've done and can reasonably anticipate fear of losing their freedom or life—a person who merely opened their mouth to speak the truth never imagines being tormented in this way. Especially not by an international organization whose public slogans closely resemble those of global human rights institutions.

Worse still, if the victim does not follow up, no response is received from the CCF.

Every three or four months, either electronically or in person through their legal representative, a new request is submitted.

The lawyer either sends a formal letter or delivers it directly to Lyon.

Approximately a month later, a response arrives stating that the Commission is currently facing budget constraints, staffing shortages, or that the case is still under review and that further updates will be provided in due course—or that if the victim has any additional documents, they should be submitted.

“What more could they possibly need beyond a final court ruling for a politically motivated death sentence? To this day, we have no idea.”

Neutrality or Negligence?

Q: Do you believe the CCF is doing this intentionally? With a face whose redness had only just begun to fade, he responded with visible discomfort and genuine disbelief:

I'm not saying that. In principle, I am bound to place my trust in the CCF's impartiality.

But the problem is this: one of Iran's neighbouring countries—despite having strong diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic and even an active extradition treaty in place—was able to understand the core issue and issue a ruling in favour of the victim in less than two months.

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The court granted the victim full release and explicitly acknowledged the life-threatening risk he faces from the Iranian regime. This ruling serves as undeniable proof of the danger he is in.

Yet the CCF, and INTERPOL as an international organization—whose own constitution explicitly outlines the principles of neutrality and legal compliance—has either failed to acknowledge the obvious legal violations present in the victim’s case, or continues to delay resolution.

Perhaps something else is at play—something we are not yet aware of.

When Delay Becomes Complicity

Q: Let’s return to the central issue—how do you interpret the CCF’s delays, as someone who is directly witnessing them?

He answered: When delay becomes complicity.

The only development in the case of the victim—after a year and a half of relentless follow-ups and repeated efforts by our legal team—has been a single email from the CCF stating that the Red Notice *may* be provisionally suspended.

Even this so-called development has provided little to no practical relief.

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The threat to the victim's life remains real and immediate. And the procedural ambiguity within INTERPOL only adds to the psychological weight that the victim, more than anyone else, carries every single day.

From my perspective—as someone closely involved in this case and fully aware of the legal obligations under international human rights law and the Geneva Conventions—any organization bound by these principles is required to act without delay if there is even the slightest risk to a person's life or safety, particularly in cases involving politically motivated persecution.

And yet, INTERPOL responds to this very real, life-threatening situation not with urgency, but with excuses—citing budgetary constraints, staffing shortages, and other administrative limitations.

These justifications are hollow—not only to us, but especially to the victim, who has endured immeasurable emotional, psychological, and legal suffering throughout this ordeal.

What makes the situation even more disturbing is the evident contrast: while INTERPOL has failed to provide timely support in this case, it continues to engage efficiently and without hesitation with authoritarian regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran. These governments appear to face no shortage of access or institutional cooperation.

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The contrast is stark: where justice calls for action, bureaucracy offers only postponement. And in that limbo, the life of the victim hangs in the balance.

After months of inaction, procedural vagueness, and institutional silence, both I and the legal team assisting the victim have reached a painful conclusion:

The lofty promises of free expression, and the protective frameworks outlined in UN conventions, have—at least in the case of this victim—become little more than empty slogans.

There is no universal enforcement. No real accountability.

Each organization retreats behind its own internal policies—even when those policies clearly contradict the very principles they claim to protect.

In fact, as evidenced in this very book, we have included an official letter from INTERPOL addressed to the victim.

Though its tone may appear formal, the message reveals an uncomfortable truth: even within institutions that claim to uphold justice and human rights, decisions are often shaped by bureaucratic protocols—not by the law, and certainly not by human dignity.

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While we are unable to publicly display the specific error in the victim's surname due to confidentiality, INTERPOL is fully aware of the issue—and yet, no correction was made, even after it was formally reported.

This seemingly minor detail speaks volumes. In the official communication from INTERPOL—an organization that claims to uphold the highest standards of neutrality and procedural integrity—the victim's surname was entered with a typographical error. This is not merely a clerical oversight; it reflects a troubling level of negligence, even in documentation that carries significant legal and reputational consequences.

When such an error is allowed to stand, especially after being brought to the organization's attention, it raises a deeper question: If basic identity details cannot be handled with care, what level of scrutiny is applied to the rest of the file?

"There is one fundamental question I still cannot resolve: Why should the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF)—the very body tasked with oversight—be embedded within the organizational structure of INTERPOL itself, rather than operating as an independent and external authority?"

In the continuation of this conversation, I will provide you with the most recent letter sent by INTERPOL to the victim. However, certain

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parts of it—clearly marked—must be removed prior to publication, both to protect the victim’s privacy and to maintain the confidentiality of INTERPOL.

Only then may the document be shared or reproduced. (Next Page)



Chapter 4 - Hunted in the Shadows



Commission de Contrôle des Fichiers de l'O.I.P.C. - INTERPOL

Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files

Comisión de Control de los Ficheros de la OIPC-INTERPOL

لجنة الرقابة على محفوظات المنظمة الدولية للشرطة الجنائية (الإنتربول)

INTERPOL's Independent Authority for the Control and Protection of Personal Data

By e-mail only

Our ref: [REDACTED]

Subject: Request concerning [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

We acknowledge receipt of your correspondences addressed to the Commission for INTERPOL's Files and received on [REDACTED]. The information provided was added to your submission concerning your client.

In relation to your request for interim measures, We would like to inform you that as a precautionary measure in certain cases, access by INTERPOL member countries to specific data may be provisionally block. This means INTERPOL member countries do not have access to the data concerned that is registered in INTERPOL's Files, pending a conclusion of the review of the compliance of these files with INTERPOL's rules and regulations. This temporary measure will be taken by the INTERPOL General Secretary in your client's case. It decided to wait for the additional document to verify the authenticity of the signature and/or the identity of the signatory, and the documents in this case.

Please send the English translation and authorization of judicial decisions that have been issued concerning your client's case specifically, and please include the title, date, case reference number, and issuing authority, and the power of attorney, we invite you to do so within one month from the present letter.

In addition, please note that The CCF has been experiencing delays in meeting its deadlines due to increases in the workload of the CCF and other INTERPOL stakeholders. The 92nd INTERPOL General Assembly approved additional funding for the CCF which will enable the hiring of new staff, and the INTERPOL General Secretariat is working with the CCF to develop new information technology tools.

We will keep you informed of further developments in due course.

Yours faithfully,

[REDACTED]
Secretariat to the Commission
for the Control of INTERPOL's Files

Chapter 5

Inside Interpol: Power, Limits, and Loopholes

The Promise of Global Justice...

Q: Based on your own experience working with INTERPOL in various capacities during your time in the Iranian police, could you explain the structure of INTERPOL and the different types of notices it issues?

He answered: The Promise of Global Justice...

The idea of Interpol was noble: to fight transnational crime through shared intelligence and legal cooperation. However, this very structure—designed to be neutral and efficient—has also created vulnerabilities that are increasingly exploited by authoritarian regimes.

The Technical and Legal Framework

At the core of Interpol's operations is the I-24/7 network—a secure communications system that connects law enforcement bodies across its member states. Through this system, countries can: share data about fugitives and suspects, request assistance with ongoing investigations, and issue alerts and notices, including the widely known Red Notice.

Interpol issues several types of notices, each with a specific colour code:

- Red Notice – To locate and provisionally arrest a person for extradition
- Blue Notice – To collect information about a person's identity or location
- Green Notice – To warn about someone's criminal activities
- Yellow Notice – For locating missing persons
- Orange Notice – For warning about threats or weapons
- Black Notice – For unidentified bodies
- Purple Notice – For methods used in crimes
- Silver Notice – To track illicit assets and financial flows (New)
- Interpol-UN Security Council Special Notices

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Among these, the Red Notice is the most powerful—and the most controversial.

The Red Notice

The Red Notice Is a Power Without Oversight And with it, the illusion of elevated legal and judicial legitimacy!

A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant, yet in practice, it acts like one.

Once a member country files a Red Notice request—typically via its National Central Bureau (NCB)—Interpol evaluates whether the request complies with its constitution, particularly Article 3, which prohibits political, military, religious, or racial matters.

But here lies the problem: Interpol’s review process is mostly administrative, and the organization relies heavily on the information provided by the requesting country. It does not conduct a deep legal investigation or verify the authenticity of national evidence before publishing a Red Notice.

This means that:

- If a regime submits a well-drafted request—complete with legal language, national arrest warrants, and “evidence”—Interpol often accepts it at face value.

Chapter 5 - Inside Interpol: Power, Limits, and Loopholes

- The review is done by a small team of legal experts, not an independent judiciary.
- There is no trial, no hearing, no testimony from the accused.

As a result, many politically motivated Red Notices slip through the cracks and become international alerts, with the potential to: lead to arrest or detention abroad, trigger asset freezes, ruin reputations and cause job loss, visa denials, or travel bans, intimidate dissidents and silence critics.

Even during my time in service, there were instances where Red Notices were approved in less than two hours—a fact that is both heartbreaking and terrifying, especially when such notices were requested by the authoritarian regime of Iran.

Loopholes and Legal Grey Zones

Q: Why does this happen, despite Interpol's constitutional restrictions?

He replied:

Because Interpol's system:

- Trusts member states by default include Iran!
- Lacks real-time oversight or external monitoring

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- Does not proactively investigate political motivation unless challenged
- Relies on victims or third-party organizations to file complaints

In theory, any Red Notice can be challenged by submitting a complaint to Interpol's Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF). But in practice:

- The process is opaque and extremely slow (taking at least one to two years at minimum—and in many cases, dragging on for several years.)
- The CCF has limited authority and no enforcement powers and other problems like staff or budget
- The Red Notice remains active during the entire review period
- Meanwhile, the individual may already be arrested, deported, or harassed
- The individual is rarely notified directly by INTERPOL or the host country.
- Many lawyers unfamiliar with INTERPOL procedures cannot navigate the system effectively.

Chapter 5 - Inside Interpol: Power, Limits, and Loopholes

Worse still, Interpol does not notify all countries if a Red Notice is deleted—meaning a person can remain “flagged” in certain databases of another countries long after their name is cleared.

The Structural Vulnerabilities

Q: Who Is Responsible?

He took a deep breath and replied:

Interpol’s internal staff (Lyon) may act in good faith, but the organization’s structure is vulnerable by design.

Each country has its own National Central Bureau (NCB), responsible for submitting and receiving information. These NCBs operate under their respective governments, meaning they reflect the policies and power structures of their regimes.

For authoritarian states like Iran this opens the door to:

- Abuse of Red Notices for political retaliation
- Exporting domestic repression beyond borders
- Creating legal harassment of exiled dissidents
- Gathering of private information and invasion of dissidents' personal privacy

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- Obtaining details about the residence and family members of political critics

In essence, Interpol's neutrality depends on the honesty of its members—many of whom do not play fair.

This is precisely when the system breaks down—and begins to move against the very notion of justice.

Interpol has, in some high-profile cases, rejected or removed politically motivated Red Notices. However, these cases are the exception, not the rule. Most victims only discover the abuse after being detained at a foreign airport, denied a visa, or informed by local police.

In the absence of transparency, independent oversight, and accountability, Interpol remains a powerful tool—but one that can be weaponized as easily as it can be utilized.

In practice, it must be acknowledged that a Red Notice issued by Interpol is not equivalent to a judicial warrant in the territory of any country other than the one that requested it. The authority to act upon such notices depends entirely on bilateral or multilateral judicial agreements between the issuing country and the host country where the individual resides or is apprehended.

Chapter 5 - Inside Interpol: Power, Limits, and Loopholes

This is where the story turns darker—particularly for individuals targeted by states like Iran, which maintains deep diplomatic and security ties with neighbouring countries.

In recent years, numerous cases have surfaced where Red Notices appeared to be the result of prior diplomatic coordination between Iranian authorities and neighbouring states. These instances have led to arrests, detentions, and forced returns of individuals who had sought refuge or were simply residing abroad.

Red Notices Become Political Weapons

To illustrate this pattern, consider the following example:

What follows is solely my personal opinion—formed after thorough consideration of the facts, available evidence, and the process of assembling the many pieces of this complex puzzle.

On 17 January 2023, Iran's then-Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, travelled to Ankara, where he met with his Turkish counterpart, several senior security officials, and other high-ranking authorities. According to public reports from Turkish state-affiliated news agencies, the discussions focused on expanding bilateral cooperation, regional security, counterterrorism efforts, and preparations for an anticipated visit by Iran's then-President, Ebrahim Raisi, to Turkey.

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This visit marked the revival of Iran–Turkey security relations, which had previously fallen into a deep silence due to a series of abductions, assassinations, and terrorist acts carried out by the Iranian regime against its critics. Prior to this point, security cooperation had remained minimal and largely symbolic, with Turkey’s intelligence services pursuing such cases in a sporadic and cautious manner, if at all. However, following the 2023 meeting, a new phase of security alignment emerged—one that granted Iran increased latitude to conduct seemingly legitimate operations within Turkish territory under the cover of international mechanisms.

Approximately a few months after this high-level security engagement—which reportedly involved nearly one hundred senior security officials from both countries—Red Notices were issued by Iran for a significant number of Iranian nationals. Many of these individuals either held Turkish citizenship or were residing legally in Turkey under valid residency permits.

Among those targeted were individuals who had long held legal residency or even full Turkish citizenship—some of whom had not returned to Iran for years.

Silent Revocations

Subsequently, Turkish authorities began revoking both residency permits and citizenships. In cases involving naturalized citizens,

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revocations occurred under direct presidential orders, according to reports and documents in my possession.

These revocations of citizenship or residency were carried out in complete silence, without any official notification to the individuals concerned.

The revocation of citizenship, in particular, was published solely in the official government gazette—something no ordinary citizen reads on a daily basis.

Residency cancellations, on the other hand, were executed through the national system without any personal notice.

According to the documents and evidence available, those whose citizenship was revoked had continued, in the meantime, to use the benefits of their Turkish nationality—including access to their bank accounts—and, in several documented cases, had even used their Turkish passports for entry and exit.

Only after several months—once the legal window for appeal had quietly expired—did the actual enforcement phase begin.

Regardless of the specific charges leveled against each person—whether criminal in nature or politically fabricated—several individuals were arrested in what appeared to be coordinated, high-profile operations.

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Others were summoned to their local police stations, immigration offices, or regional security branches under the pretense of providing a “brief explanation,” and were then detained without warning, while going about their normal lives.

With the intensification of police checkpoints—especially by Turkey’s security units in crowded urban areas—more individuals were arrested on the spot, unaware that they were even being pursued.

A significant number of individuals were transferred to detention camps designated for those allegedly residing illegally in the country, while others were held in prison, awaiting judicial rulings on whether they would be extradited or not.

Even more troubling was the fact that Turkey, despite the documented legal residency—and in some cases, full citizenship—of many of these individuals, publicly denied their lawful presence in the country.

They were officially declared as “illegal residents” and subsequently transferred to deportation centres.

The consequences for victims were severe and, in many cases, irreparable:

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- **Psychological and physical trauma:** Living under the constant threat of arrest or rendition inflicted intense emotional distress and, in some cases, physical harm due to prolonged anxiety.
- **Loss of legal identity:** Sudden revocation of residency or citizenship left many in a legal limbo, without access to basic services or protections.
- **Irrecoverable financial harm:** Assets were frozen, bank accounts closed, and years of investment destroyed with no viable path to restitution.
- **Family and social breakdown:** Victims faced separation from their loved ones, social isolation, loss of employment, and a collapse of trust in international legal systems.

Human Toll

These incidents exemplify the systematic abuse of international mechanisms to export political repression beyond borders. They underscore an urgent need for greater scrutiny, oversight, and accountability within INTERPOL and similar institutions—before justice is permanently displaced by diplomatic expedience.

I do not deny that among those targeted by Iranian-issued Red Notices, there may have been genuinely dangerous criminals.

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However, I speak with certainty—and the Turkish authorities are well aware of this fact—that many others were neither criminals nor threats to society.

Their only “offence” was speaking out publicly and critically against the Iranian regime, which led them into this relentless spiral of statelessness and institutional persecution.

Engineered Statelessness

And when I use the word “statelessness,” I do so deliberately. Because an outspoken dissident cannot reasonably rely on their Iranian citizenship due to the regime’s constant threats and retaliation—nor can they benefit from a second citizenship or residency that has now been stripped away. If such a person is not to be considered stateless, then what exactly are they?

In my view, the Turkish government could have easily determined, through proper investigation, that many of these individuals were not a threat, but rather an asset to society.

Some had genuinely contributed to the Turkish community and lived exemplary lives, marked by integrity and social responsibility.

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In several cases, they were entrepreneurs who had brought their families and invested their life savings into the belief that Turkey was a safe, free country—one not subject to Iran’s political influence.

But today, we are witnessing a troubling shift, in which even Turkey’s domestic policies are beginning to show signs of strain when it comes to freedom of expression.

Now, with all the pieces of the puzzle laid out, it becomes increasingly clear how these criminal notices issued by Iran may, in fact, be closely linked to diplomatic meetings held between Iranian security officials and neighbouring states.

This sequence strongly suggests that formal agreements or assurances of cooperation were reached regarding specific individuals known to be residing in Turkey, before Iran proceeded to request Red Notices through INTERPOL.

This was a fully verifiable case, supported by documents and repeated reports. Now let me speak of a victim I know.

Unheeded Lives

In the case of the victim discussed herein—who had been living in one of Iran’s neighbouring countries—the physical harm inflicted was so severe that they were immediately transferred to a hospital

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upon release and underwent emergency surgery. His medical recovery spanned several months.

The psychological trauma—both to the victim and their family—was, based on documented evidence, irreparable.

As for financial damages, which ironically constitute the least severe aspect of the ordeal, they have persisted for nearly two years and show no signs of resolution.

This detail completes the puzzle in the victim's case—fitting into place with disturbing precision, and casting a shadow of truth that reveals a much darker reality:

a sustained political campaign by the Iranian regime to retrieve its critics abroad, subject them to interrogation, torture, and, in many cases, execution.

In this specific case, the victim had not travelled to Iran for many years. It is categorically impossible for him to have committed any physical or criminal offence within Iranian territory. Without presence in the country, the alleged crime simply could not have occurred.

What I have uncovered through lived experience and meticulous analysis could—and should—have been identified far more easily,

and far more swiftly, by the CCF using the resources and authority already available to it.

Yet, that has not happened.

Real Red Impact

Q: What happens when someone is the subject of a Red Notice?

He explained with a hint of sorrow:

This is something not everyone understands.

Once a Red Notice is published, the person named in it may lose access to basic legal protections. They are often detained by local police forces without proper judicial review, even if they have never committed a crime—not even a minor traffic offence. And yet, such individuals are treated as high-level fugitives. They are transported from one facility to another with hands and feet shackled, publicly humiliated and deprived of basic dignity.

Worse still, some states fail to recognise that by enforcing such Red Notices blindly, their own law enforcement institutions may be violating national judicial standards—in effect, undermining the sovereignty of their legal system and calling into question their own rule of law.

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In reality, regardless of the individual's actual conduct, political record, citizenship status or clearance of criminal record, once a Red Notice is issued, they are treated as if they were a serial killer—facing the same degrading behavior and harsh treatment, even if they have voluntarily presented themselves at a police station like our victim.

Inconvenient Truths

A series of fundamental questions naturally arise:

Q: Can INTERPOL not afford to spend even a few minutes verifying the legitimacy of a Red Notice before activating it against an individual?

A: The answer is clear: it certainly can.

Q: With its vast budget and technological infrastructure, is INTERPOL truly unable to respond promptly to complaints submitted by victims and political dissidents?

A: Again, the answer is obvious: it absolutely can—even to the extent that, in today's digital world, it could delegate the preliminary verification of documents to artificial intelligence.

Q: Does INTERPOL recognise the principle of fair trial?

A: Formally, yes. The organization's protocols state this clearly.

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But in practice, the application of that principle is alarmingly inconsistent.

Q: Can INTERPOL not exercise greater scrutiny when Red Notices are issued by regimes with well-documented records of abuse, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran?

A: Of course it can.

But when perhaps only one out of every thousand victims—like the victim—dares to raise their voice, INTERPOL appears to choose convenience over conscience, continuing to follow the same outdated procedures.

Moreover, this Organization has not been subjected to the kind of external oversight or pressure one would expect from the United Nations or international human rights bodies. There are virtually no meaningful mechanisms of accountability that ensure INTERPOL's internal operations are aligned with the values it publicly claims to defend.

Missed Opportunities

Q: So what is the solution?

He smiled, then responded:

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Let me begin by saying this. I, personally, am fully willing to collaborate with INTERPOL—entirely free of charge and without any financial expectation—solely for the purpose of preventing others from becoming victims.

My aim would be to help the Organization develop a fully robust system capable of detecting politically motivated Red Notices, or those that contradict INTERPOL's own constitutional principles, at the point of entry and upload by authoritarian regimes.

Of course, there are many others like me who would be willing to assist.

But based on my previous background as a police officer, and considering my nearly two-year-long experience with this case, I seriously doubt INTERPOL has any interest in such cooperation. It seems far more inclined to continue relying on its inherently vulnerable system.

From my perspective, INTERPOL should employ advisors or staff members who possess thorough knowledge of the judicial and civil rights frameworks of the countries submitting Red Notices—particularly when those countries are governed by authoritarian regimes.

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Without such internal expertise, it is impossible to properly assess whether a notice is rooted in legitimate criminal grounds or merely serves as a political tool disguised in legal language.

But, Ironically, the remedy lies within INTERPOL itself—embedded in its very structure, yet too often overlooked or dismissed.

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) was created precisely for this purpose: to serve as a safeguard against abuse, and to ensure that individual rights are protected from the misapplication of INTERPOL's vast powers.

And yet, as this case painfully illustrates, human lives do not always carry the urgency or priority that INTERPOL's own charter proclaims.

The CCF exists. The mechanisms are there.

The Missing Part

What's missing is the will to act.

At this point, I no longer believe the problem is about regulations or legal gaps.

The only thing truly missing is the will to act.

In this case—and in countless others like this—the solution is not complicated:

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There must be direct and independent oversight by international human rights bodies over every single Red Notice submitted by authoritarian regimes.

Without such external checks, the system will keep protecting those who abuse it—and abandoning those who are already at risk. INTERPOL cannot remain credible as a neutral organization if it refuses to accept meaningful oversight, especially when dealing with states known for violating human rights.

“I hope that in the future, INTERPOL will take this issue more seriously—just as it is expected to.”

Chapter 6

Dissecting the Red Notice

Anatomy of Political Targeting

Q: How Do You Explain This as a Case of Procedural Abuse by a Regime?

He Replied:

I will walk you through a Red Notice issued against the victim by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

For the sake of my and victim safety and privacy, the full text of the notice is not published here.

Nearly every sentence in that document refers directly to victim by name or personal detail.

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Still, I have thoroughly dissected its contents and presented an in-depth analysis, line by line, to show the degree of manipulation and threat embedded in it.

There is no attached evidence. No translated court ruling. Only vague and politicized accusations—clearly designed to criminalize dissent and justify transnational repression.

Red Notices Without Scrutiny

Q: Can a Red Notice really be activated without even translating the judge's order into one of INTERPOL's official languages?

A: I'm afraid the answer is yes.

In fact, I know from my own experience that even a short, informal summary—sometimes dictated over the phone—can be enough to trigger a global alert.

The system is so carelessly structured that regimes like Iran have learned to weaponize it with surgical precision.

And I don't say this out of theory—I say it as someone who has lived through it, seen it from the inside, and felt its impact every single day.

Although you are reviewing this authentic and verified document—officially extracted from INTERPOL's system by the internal

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security agency of another country under judicial order—I cannot authorise its complete publication.

However, I remain fully prepared to submit the unredacted version in its entirety to any legitimate court of law or internationally recognised human rights organization, should a formal request be made.

“All I can say is this: had a human being carefully reviewed this Red Notice at the time of its initial submission—examining the dates, the complainant, or the alleged offence—or had they possessed even a basic familiarity with Iran’s internal legal and administrative systems, this Notice would have never been accepted by INTERPOL’s central office. It would have been rejected outright.”

Let us now examine this Red Notice in detail—through a lens of expertise and lived experience.

What may appear as routine administrative language carries within it the unmistakable fingerprints of political intent.

This analysis is conducted with the logical precision and irrefutable insight of a former Iranian police officer—someone who not only understands the internal mechanics of the system, but has personally witnessed its consequences.

Hidden Red Notices

The first notable detail in this Red Notice is that it was intentionally marked as non-public—not by INTERPOL, but at the specific request of the Iranian authorities.

Circulation to the media (including Internet) of the extract of the notice as published on INTERPOL's public website: No

This raises a critical question: Why would the Islamic Republic of Iran, if it truly believed the individual was a criminal, deliberately request that the notice not be visible to the public or even to the individual concerned?

The answer is unsettling yet familiar:

In politically motivated cases, secrecy is not just a strategy—it is the entire objective.

By ensuring the Red Notice remains hidden, the regime prevents the target from challenging it, contesting it, or even becoming aware of its existence until it is too late.

This practice is not rare. It is, in fact, a calculated pattern—one I have seen firsthand during my years within the Iranian security establishment.

Allegations Without Evidence

The second notable detail in this Red Notice concerns the very nature of the alleged offence.

The underlying matter clearly falls within the domain of civil law, and by definition, such disputes cannot legitimately form the basis for criminal prosecution.

The description of the allegation is strikingly simplistic:

In just four lines, it states that certain individuals have filed a complaint against the victim for a physical criminal offence, and that the victim has been sentenced to several years in prison.

Yet nowhere in the Red Notice is there any indication that the individual actually committed a criminal act—or even acted with criminal intent.

All referenced proceedings appear to have been conducted under the supervision of the Iranian judiciary, following standard legal protocols.

No supporting documentation is attached.

There is no evidence.

This is not the profile of a crime.

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This is the blueprint of a political fabrication—a manufactured charge orchestrated under a Revolutionary Court ruling designed to mask the regime’s persecution of political targets.

Retroactive Criminalization

The third notable and thought-provoking detail is this: Why was the complaint filed only after so many years?

To justify this delay, the narrative claims that the alleged offence occurred several years ago—at a time when the victim was still present inside Iran.

But if this is true, then critical questions arise:

Why was no legal action taken at the time?

Why was no formal complaint lodged immediately?

And most importantly, why was a Red Notice not issued back then—especially considering that the victim legally exited the country using the very same passport mentioned in the Red Notice?

Iranian authorities not only knew that he had left the country, they were also aware of his destination abroad.

This timing appears intentional—designed to preempt the victim from asserting that he has not returned to Iran for many years. By framing the alleged crime as something that occurred before his

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departure, the regime aims to create plausible deniability and fabricate a legal context after the fact.

As someone who has served as a police officer, I find this logic almost laughable—more akin to a joke than a legitimate criminal claim. If a crime involving property or assets had truly taken place, the alleged victim would have noticed immediately—or at least within the first few months—not after several years.

What is particularly revealing is that this element of the story has not even been concealed:

The official record shows that the complainant's filing occurred after the victim had already left the country.

And yet, authorities seem intent on presenting it as though the complaint has been pending for years.

So the question remains:

If the regime knew the victim had left Iran—and was even aware of his whereabouts—why did it fail to request a Red Notice for such a supposedly serious criminal offence until now?

When all these factors are taken into account, one reaches an unavoidable conclusion:

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The commission of such a crime—given the internal legal and administrative structures governing asset transfers in the Islamic Republic of Iran—is entirely impossible.

Built-In Institutional Safeguards

Q: Too Many Gates, Yet It Slipped Through?

He Replied:

The fourth notable detail highlights the depth of institutional verification embedded in Iran’s asset transfer systems.

Let me begin by stating that, due to the need to protect the victim’s identity, we are unable to fully disclose the specific nature of the alleged offence described in the Red Notice.

As a result, we are compelled to examine all relevant asset transfer procedures in Iran—in order to establish the legal and administrative framework within which such an accusation would have to occur.

In Iran, even for something as basic as purchasing a mobile phone, a centralized electronic registry allows buyers to confirm the legal ownership of the device before proceeding.

When it comes to high-value assets, the scrutiny becomes exponentially greater.

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To sell a vehicle, for example, the process must pass through multiple layers of state-controlled authorization:

from official notary offices (which operate under the Judiciary) to the Traffic Police for vehicle clearance.

In the case of real estate, the seller must secure permissions from:

- the Real Estate Registration Office,
- the Official Notary Bureau, and
- the Tax Authority — all of which are extensions of the judicial and executive branches.

For companies, the process is even more rigorous, involving:

- notary certification, and
- formal clearance from the Company Registration Office, another Judiciary-linked institution.
- For currency transfers, conversions, or asset bartering, the process in Iran begins with the seller delivering the agreed-upon amount—either in rials or in the form of a tangible asset eligible for barter—to the buyer.

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Critically, in any lawful transaction, the buyer will thoroughly verify the full receipt of payment or the exchanged asset through official legal channels before proceeding.

This verification is not optional; it is a routine safeguard embedded in the legal framework to prevent any type of problem and ensure mutual accountability.

In Iran, even for the purchase of a mobile phone, buyers are required to verify ownership through official registration systems—platforms that are fully controlled and operated by the government.

In fact, coordinating such an extensive web of government-run institutions—some of which fall under the Judiciary, while others are overseen by the Ministry of Finance, the Treasury, the Interior Ministry, the Central Bank, and various other state agencies—is virtually impossible for any individual.

Even the Head of the Judiciary would likely be unable to orchestrate such a maneuver, given that many of these institutions operate beyond the scope of judicial authority and are compartmentalized under different branches of the government.

This is precisely the reason I previously mentioned—committing such a crime in Iran is an operational impossibility.

Due Diligence as Routine

Q: Would Anyone Really Buy Without Checking?

A: The fifth notable detail lies in the simplicity and accessibility of identity verification systems within Iran.

In today's Iran, any prospective buyer can easily verify a seller's identity and legal authority to sell an item—either in person or online—with little to no cost, often under the equivalent of one U.S. dollar.

These tools exist for the purchase of everything from mobile phones to high-value assets.

Which leads to a critical question:

If someone intends to purchase an asset worth thousands of dollars, would they not first verify that the seller is legally authorised, and that the item is not under legal restriction or debt?

Suggesting otherwise is not only illogical—it is, quite plainly, absurd.

No Deal Without Documentation

The sixth notable detail concerns the official legal process required for any asset transfer in Iran.

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In virtually all cases, no property—movable or immovable—can legally change ownership without first undergoing a full administrative process, including tax clearances, background checks, and finalization through an official notary office.

Typically, before the official transfer takes place, the buyer may pay a small deposit—not to the seller directly—but to an authorised intermediary, such as:

- a certified car dealership (in the case of vehicles),
- a licensed real estate agency (in the case of property), or
- a registered corporate consultancy (in the case of company shares).

The idea that someone would pay the full value of an asset to the seller before any legal document has been signed or notarized is not just improbable—it is absurd.

In Iran, to suggest that a transaction occurred “without an official document” is equivalent to claiming that the transaction never happened at all.

Even more astonishing is the claim—within the same four-line description—that the asset in question was fully transferred to the buyer!

Then where, exactly, did this so-called criminal act occur? Even if—purely hypothetically—there were any dispute at all (which there is not), it would be strictly civil in nature, not criminal. And yet, after all this chaos and emergency posturing—years after the alleged incident—we are expected to believe it warrants international pursuit?

Timeline Manipulation Exposed

The seventh notable detail involves a glaring inconsistency in the timeline presented within the Red Notice.

According to the document, the alleged offence occurred at an earlier point—yet the investigation, case registration, and judicial orders did not begin until significantly later.

This raises a fundamental question:

How does a serious legal matter go unnoticed for such an extended period—especially within a system as tightly controlled and procedurally rigid as the Islamic Republic of Iran?

The answer reveals a deeper fabrication:

The individual in question had already left the country by the time the case was initiated.

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To justify the issuance of a Red Notice and trigger a cross-border pursuit, the authorities were left with no choice but to backdate the offence to a time when the individual was still within their jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, the actual case development occurred much later, exposing this inconsistency as not a clerical oversight, but a deliberate manipulation.

In criminal law, the timing of an alleged offence is not a minor detail—it is central to the credibility of the case.

Any law enforcement professional would immediately recognise such a temporal gap as a serious red flag.

More troubling is this:

How is it that the complainant only initiated legal action long after the alleged transaction or event had concluded?

This suggests that the matter, if genuine at all, may fall under the category of civil dispute rather than criminal offence—making the use of INTERPOL’s mechanisms a blatant misuse of international legal tools.

Clearly, even if the claim were genuine—which it is not—it would fall entirely under the category of civil and ownership disputes,

which, according to INTERPOL's Constitution, are explicitly outside the scope of matters the Organization is permitted to pursue.

In effect, the timeline itself becomes the evidence.

Sentenced Without Trial

The eighth notable detail casts serious doubt on the legal authority behind the issuance of the Red Notice itself.

A simple search reveals that the judicial branch listed as the origin of the case is not a criminal court, but an investigative division—specifically a prosecutor's office.

According to Iran's Code of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor or investigator does not have the authority to issue prison sentences.

Their role is strictly limited to conducting preliminary investigations, preparing formal indictments, and referring cases to a criminal court.

And yet, this Red Notice plainly states that a multi-year prison sentence has already been issued against the victim—before the case has even reached a court.

This raises an obvious question:

How can a person be declared guilty and sentenced to prison in a case that is still under investigation, and issued by a body that lacks the legal power to deliver such judgments?

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The answer is as clear as it is troubling:

This is not justice. This is fabrication.

And what is even more revealing is this: How can a case that was allegedly opened several years ago still remain in the investigative stage?

This alone adds another layer to the fictional nature of the accusations.

It is evident that the case was only recently opened—hence why it is still under prosecutorial review.

In fact, this represents one of the most blatant errors made by the Iranian regime in the issuance of this Red Notice—a clear oversight that exposes the lack of legal grounding and the politically driven nature of the case.

Violation of Due Process

The ninth notable issue strikes at the heart of INTERPOL's core legal principles: the right to a fair trial.

Even if we were to accept the highly unlikely assumption that the individual is guilty, we are immediately confronted with a procedural outrage:

Q: How was a prison sentence issued in complete absence of the accused?

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A: The judicial authority named in the case is not a criminal court but a prosecutor's office, which already lacks sentencing powers. But more alarmingly, the entire investigation, prosecution, and issuance of the Red Notice took place while the victim was no longer in Iran.

Iranian authorities did not possess his updated contact details. No summons was served. No official notification was delivered.

The accused was given no opportunity to respond to allegations, present a defence, or even know he was being prosecuted.

In essence, the legal process was conducted behind closed doors—crafted, executed, and concluded without the defendant's knowledge or participation.

According to INTERPOL's own legal framework and **Article 3 of its Constitution of INTERPOL**, any international pursuit must adhere to the principles of due process and fair hearing.

In this case, those principles were not merely ignored—they were entirely bypassed.

This alone renders the Red Notice invalid under INTERPOL's standards, regardless of the case's content or outcome.

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It can therefore be concluded that the sentence was issued entirely in absentia, by an authority that lacked the legal jurisdiction to do so—without the victim’s knowledge or any formal notification.

This not only violates basic judicial norms, but also stands in clear contradiction to INTERPOL’s own legal standards for fair prosecution and international cooperation.

Specifically, **Article 2 of the Constitution of INTERPOL** requires that all actions carried out through INTERPOL respect the “spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” which includes the right to a fair trial, legal defence, and proper notification.

In addition, **Article 3 prohibits INTERPOL** from undertaking any intervention of a political, military, racial, or religious character.

This case, in both its substance and its process, fails to meet the minimum standards of due process and neutrality, and thus renders the Red Notice procedurally and ethically invalid.

All of this becomes even more problematic in light of one undeniable fact:

The victim possesses clear, comprehensive, and irrefutable evidence demonstrating that he is a former member of the military, a known critic of the Iranian regime, and a politically persecuted individual. These facts were neither considered nor mentioned in the case files

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submitted by Iranian authorities—yet they fundamentally alter the nature of the case and its eligibility under INTERPOL's own rules.

The deliberate omission of terms such as “retired military officer,” “former serviceman,” “discharged,” or “deserter” in the Red Notice is not accidental. Had such terms been included, the political or military nature of the case would have become unmistakably clear—rendering the Red Notice ineligible under INTERPOL’s own constitutional rules.

Although INTERPOL’s review mechanisms are often weak when it comes to identifying political motivation, there is still a clear sensitivity within the system to specific indicators and keywords.

The absence of military-related identifiers in the victim’s file reflects a strategic effort by the submitting state to avoid triggering that scrutiny.

Missing Arrest Warrant

The tenth and perhaps most damning flaw in this Red Notice appears near the bottom of the first page, in what might seem like an administrative footnote—but in fact, reveals everything:

Copy of arrest warrant available at the General Secretariat in the language used by the requesting country: No

"Copy of arrest warrant available at the General Secretariat in the language used by the requesting country: No."

This brief statement has enormous implications. It means that not even a Persian-language version of the arrest warrant was submitted to INTERPOL—let alone the mandatory English translation required under INTERPOL protocols.

Why would a country like Iran omit the very document that justifies the international pursuit of an individual?

The answer is as telling as it is disturbing:

Because such a document either did not exist at the time, or was so legally flawed that its inclusion could expose the entire case—and the Iranian judicial system itself—to international scrutiny and embarrassment.

In reality, it appears that no valid arrest warrant, no formal detention order, and no legitimate sentencing decree existed when this Red Notice was submitted.

And yet, the Iranian authorities moved forward anyway—most likely in a rush to ensure the victim was tracked before any delay could jeopardize their efforts.

And what was the reason for this rush?

It was driven by a political arrangement—one coordinated between the Iranian regime and its neighbouring state concerning this individual and others like him.

The regime simply did not have the time to construct a solid criminal case.

The objective was not legal integrity, but expedited political execution.

This isn't merely a procedural oversight.

It is evidence of deliberate concealment.

Flawed Identity Submission

The eleventh notable flaw not only reinforces the previous point—it serves as direct evidence of it.

As seen in the Red Notice, two critical identity markers—each as vital as a person's name or surname for international identification—were initially incorrect.

These core identifiers were only corrected several months after the original Red Notice had already been uploaded and circulated across INTERPOL systems.

Due to the need to protect the victim's privacy, we will refrain from specifying exactly which identity details were flawed.

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However, both INTERPOL and the CCF are fully aware of the issue—not only because of the Iranian regime’s own post-issuance update, but also through our formal communication with them.

This is not a minor clerical oversight.

It reveals a reckless and unjustified urgency—a rushed attempt to initiate international tracking without even verifying the most basic personal information of the individual targeted.

When a state issues a Red Notice based on inaccurate identity data, it casts serious doubt not only on the integrity of the process, but on the true intent behind the request.

Such errors are not merely unacceptable—they are revealing. They expose a deeper institutional negligence, one that casts doubt on the credibility of the entire process and undermines trust in the system’s capacity to uphold justice.

Extradition Without Basis

The twelfth notable flaw lies in the stated objective of the Red Notice itself, as clearly outlined on page two of the document:

“LOCATE AND ARREST WITH A VIEW TO EXTRADITION”

Assurances are given that extradition will be sought upon arrest of the

person, in conformity with national laws and/or the applicable bilateral and multilateral treaties.

PROVISIONAL ARREST

This request is to be treated as a formal request for provisional arrest...

These declarations suggest that Iranian authorities are seeking not just to locate the individual, but to have him provisionally arrested with a clear intent to request extradition—a process that, under international norms, requires a valid court-issued arrest warrant and substantial documentation.

And yet, as previously demonstrated, no copy of an arrest warrant has been submitted—neither in Persian nor in English.

Nor has there been any proof that the victim was ever formally notified, summoned, or given the opportunity to defend himself.

This glaring contradiction between what is claimed in the Red Notice and what actually exists in the legal record strongly suggests that Iranian authorities used the Interpol system to simulate the appearance of due process—without any of its substance.

In short, they requested international cooperation for an arrest and extradition without presenting the foundational legal justification that such cooperation requires.

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Regardless of the fact that the individual is a well-documented political dissident, even if we were to assume he were guilty—which he is not—this Red Notice remains legally and ethically invalid.

What is perhaps even more alarming is a line found at the end of this same section on page two of the Red Notice:

“In order for this notice to be kept up to date, please send any additional information about this person to NCB Iran.”

On the surface, this might appear as a routine procedural statement.

But in the context of this case, it reveals a far more disturbing practice: the use of INTERPOL as a backchannel to gather intelligence on political dissidents abroad.

Rather than using internal resources or legal channels, the Iranian regime leverages this global platform to crowdsource missing information about the victim—such as updated contact details, whereabouts, and personal identifiers.

This is not law enforcement. This is data-hunting under the guise of international cooperation.

Accountability Demands Action

As we reach the end of this chapter, a long list of critical and deeply troubling questions begins to form—questions that go beyond legal

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technicalities and strike at the core of global justice, The Questions That Demand Answers:

- Can INTERPOL truly not screen such deeply flawed Red Notices at the outset?
- After a victim formally submits a complaint, is the organization unable—or unwilling—to identify the glaring contradictions?
- Is it not possible for INTERPOL, within minutes of reviewing the Red Notice and the victim's documentation, to recognise that the person is being persecuted by an unjust court and has been sentenced in absentia?
- Can't the system suspend such a notice provisionally during the initial review, simply out of caution and in the interest of human life?
- Does INTERPOL have no early filtering mechanism to stop politically motivated Red Notices before they are activated?
- Is it truly acceptable that INTERPOL accepts arrest requests without a valid court-issued warrant?

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- Shouldn't INTERPOL establish a separate, stricter process for countries with a consistent history of abusing international legal systems—like Iran?
- Can't the organization move faster to respond to victims, before they or their families face irreversible consequences, including death?
- Does INTERPOL assume no responsibility if a victim is forcibly returned to a dictatorship and executed based on a fabricated Red Notice?
- Does it not feel complicit when its mechanisms are turned into instruments of human rights violations?
- Why must victims suffer months—or years—of social exclusion, blocked mobility, frozen assets, and reputational harm while their innocence is “under review”?
- Is it acceptable that children of victims are denied education, healthcare, and stability simply because INTERPOL delays its internal processes?
- Shouldn't the United Nations and human rights organizations demand legally binding guarantees before allowing such cooperation to continue with regimes like Iran?

Chapter 6 - Dissecting the Red Notice

- Shouldn't European institutions—home to INTERPOL's headquarters—inspect and hold accountable an organization whose tools are being used to silence and destroy dissidents?
- Does it really take INTERPOL or the CCF several years to merely suspend a Red Notice in a case this blatantly flawed?
- Does it matter at all what happens to the victim during this prolonged delay?
- Are there any specific institutions tasked with protecting such victims while they are trapped in legal, social, and humanitarian limbo?

In closing, one cannot help but restate an unsettling truth:

If these documents and inconsistencies were handed to any ordinary person—even without legal training—they would immediately recognise the contradictions, the absurdities, and the political undercurrents.

And yet, the lingering question remains:

How is it that a legal body like the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF), with its access to legal experts, investigators, and procedural frameworks, fails to reach the same conclusion—over a year later?

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
The victim and his family—clear and recognised targets of this flawed system—wait anxiously, under immense psychological and emotional pressure, for an answer to that very question.

That is, of course... if an answer ever comes.

“These are not rhetorical questions.

These are moral obligations.

And they demand not just responses—but ACTION.”



Chapter 7

Case Studies

Lives Behind Red Notices

Behind every formal Red Notice lies a life disrupted — sometimes destroyed. These notices, while framed in legal terminology, often serve as political instruments for authoritarian regimes.

This chapter presents real case studies of how Interpol's systems have been systematically abused to pursue dissenters, exiles, artists, journalists, and even world leaders.

What may appear as a routine international police request can, in reality, be a calculated act of political repression. The Red Notice system, intended to combat serious transnational crime, has become a silent weapon in the hands of those who fear dissent more than disorder.

Red Notice Against a President and Officials!

1. Donald Trump and 47 U.S. Officials (president of U.S.A and U.S Government Officials)

- **Date of Request:** June 2020 and renewed in January 2021
- **Charges:** Involvement in the assassination of Qassem Soleimani
- **Status:** Interpol rejected the request due to its political/military nature
- **Source:** Al Jazeera, January 5, 2021

In an unprecedented move reflecting the extent to which authoritarian regimes can exploit international legal frameworks, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested a Red Notice from INTERPOL in June 2020—later renewing the request in January 2021—targeting then-President Donald J. Trump and 47 senior U.S. officials.

The alleged charges centred on their involvement in the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad airport on January 3, 2020.

Iran's legal framing of the request was based on accusations of state terrorism and murder.

However, INTERPOL swiftly rejected the request, citing Article 3 of its Constitution, which strictly prohibits the organization from undertaking any intervention or activity of a political, military, racial, or religious character.

This case underscores the vulnerability of international policing systems to politically motivated abuse.

While no Red Notice was ever published or circulated through INTERPOL's systems, Iran's attempt itself serves as a cautionary tale: even the most powerful global actors are not immune to the symbolic, retaliatory ambitions of authoritarian governments—nor are international legal bodies entirely shielded from their misuse.

From Red Notice to Execution

2. Rouhollah Zam (founder of the anti-regime media outlet "AmadNews")

- **Date of Red Notice:** October 2019
- **Charges:** "Spreading corruption on earth" through anti-government media activities

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- **Status:** Arrested in Iraq, extradited to Iran, and executed in December 2020
- **Source:** Radio Farda, December 12, 2020

Rouhollah Zam, the founder of the anti-regime media outlet *AmadNews*, became a high-profile target of the Iranian authorities due to his online coverage of protests and corruption. In 2019, Iranian officials reportedly issued a Red Notice through INTERPOL, accusing Zam of “spreading corruption on earth”—a charge commonly used against political dissidents and punishable by death under Iran’s penal code.

While the Red Notice was never publicly released, several international sources—including France 24 and Reporters Without Borders—have indicated that Iranian authorities attempted to use INTERPOL’s channels to locate Zam. He was lured to Iraq under false pretenses, abducted by Iranian intelligence agents, and forcibly returned to Iran, where he was tried in a closed court and executed in December 2020.

This case is one of the most chilling examples of how INTERPOL’s systems—even when not fully activated—can be exploited to facilitate extrajudicial renditions. The mere involvement of INTERPOL in identifying the location of a dissident can serve as a

signal for authoritarian regimes to proceed with cross-border abductions. Zam's fate was not just a violation of international legal norms—it was a warning to every journalist: telling the truth may cost your life.

Tracked, Trapped, Executed

3. Habib Farajollah Chaab (Habib Asyud)

- **Date of Notice:** Initially around 2007; reaffirmed in 2018
- **Charges:** Leadership of a separatist Arab group and orchestrating attacks in Khuzestan
- **Status:** Kidnapped in Turkey, extradited to Iran, and executed in May 2023
- **Source:** Radio Farda, May 6, 2023

Your Citizenship Doesn't Protect You! Habib Farajollah Chaab, also known as Habib Asyud, was an Iranian-born Swedish citizen and the former leader of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), a separatist group labeled as a terrorist organization by the Iranian government. In 2007, Iran reportedly requested INTERPOL's cooperation in locating him, a request that was not made public. After a period of relative silence, the case

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resurfaced in 2018 following a deadly attack in Ahvaz, which Iran blamed on foreign-based dissidents.

Multiple reports, including from *Amnesty International* and *BBC Persian*, suggest that Iranian officials attempted to reactivate previous Red Notice channels to monitor Chaab's movements. In October 2020, he travelled from Sweden to Turkey—believing it to be a neutral and safe country. There, he was abducted in Istanbul by individuals acting on behalf of Iranian intelligence and smuggled into Iran across the border. He was held incommunicado, tried without due process, and sentenced to death.

Despite his Swedish citizenship and international calls for fair treatment, Chaab was executed in May 2023. His case exposes a deeply alarming trend: authoritarian regimes exploiting INTERPOL's information-sharing framework as a precursor to extrajudicial renditions and executions. It also highlights how citizenship or residency in a democratic country may offer little to no protection when political vengeance overrides legal safeguards.

Abducted, Silenced, Sentenced

4. Jamshid Sharmahd (German-Iranian dissident, linked to Tondar/Kingdom Assembly)

- **Date of Red Notice:** 2009

- **Charges:** Involvement in the 2008 Shiraz bombing
- **Status:** Abducted in Dubai, extradited to Iran, sentenced to death in February 2023
- **Source:** Al Jazeera, February 21, 2023

Jamshid Sharmahd, a German-Iranian dual national and spokesperson for the opposition group Tondar (Kingdom Assembly of Iran), became a high-value target of the Iranian regime following a 2008 explosion in Shiraz—an attack the government attributed to his group. In 2009, Iranian authorities reportedly submitted a Red Notice request through INTERPOL.

While this Red Notice was never officially published by INTERPOL, the Iranian state media (*IRIB News*) publicly claimed in 2022 that Sharmahd had been listed on INTERPOL’s wanted system for years—a rare admission that suggests the regime actively leveraged international policing channels against him.

(Source: *IRIB News*, October 26, 2022)

Sharmahd, who had been living openly in the United States and later Germany, was abducted in July 2020 while transiting through Dubai. In what experts describe as a textbook case of cross-border rendition, Iranian agents forcibly transported him to Iran. He was held

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incommunicado, denied independent legal counsel, and prosecuted in a tightly controlled trial that failed to meet even the most basic standards of due process. In February 2023, he was sentenced to death.

According to Amnesty International and several UN Special Rapporteurs, Sharmahd's trial was "grossly unfair" and "politically motivated." The use of INTERPOL's mechanisms—whether formal or informal—played a significant role in facilitating his capture. The case underscores how easily authoritarian regimes can exploit international policing tools to bypass domestic law and silence dissent abroad.

Targeted on U.S. Soil

5. Masih Alinejad (*U.S.-based Iranian journalist and women's rights activist*)

- **Date of Interpol Request:** 2019
- **Charges:** Undermining national security via media activism
- **Status:** Living in the U.S.; attempted kidnapping in 2021 was foiled
- **Source:** Freedom House, 2021

Masih Alinejad, an Iranian-American journalist and women's rights activist, has long been a thorn in the side of the Iranian regime. Her campaigns, notably "My Stealthy Freedom," encouraged Iranian women to defy compulsory hijab laws, drawing international attention and ire from Tehran.

In 2019, Iranian authorities reportedly submitted a request to INTERPOL for a Red Notice against Alinejad, accusing her of "propaganda against the state" and "collaboration with hostile governments." While INTERPOL did not act on this request, the mere attempt underscores Iran's strategy of leveraging international mechanisms to suppress dissent.

The situation escalated in 2021 when U.S. federal prosecutors unveiled charges against Iranian intelligence officials for plotting to kidnap Alinejad from her New York residence. The plan involved transporting her to Venezuela and then to Iran. The FBI thwarted this plot, highlighting the regime's audacity in targeting dissidents abroad.

In 2022, the threat intensified. Two Eastern European nationals, Rafat Amirov and Polad Omarov, were convicted in a U.S. federal court for orchestrating a murder-for-hire scheme against Alinejad, acting on behalf of the Iranian government. The plot involved surveillance of her home and the hiring of a hitman equipped with an assault rifle.

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This conviction marked a significant moment in exposing Iran's transnational repression tactics.

These events illustrate a disturbing pattern: the Iranian regime's relentless pursuit of critics, employing both legal and illicit means. Alinejad's case serves as a stark reminder of the lengths to which authoritarian governments will go to silence opposition, even beyond their borders or in USA.

Political Charges, Global Reach In War

6. Leaders of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK)

- **Date of Interpol Use:** Ongoing since the 2000s
- **Charges:** Armed resistance and bombings in the 1980s
- **Status:** Based in Europe; requests rejected due to political nature
- **Source:** Statements from Iranian Interpol officials

Political Warfare via INTERPOL:

"Regardless of the group's controversial history, this case is examined purely from the standpoint of INTERPOL's neutrality and the abuse of Red Notice mechanisms."

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), has been a long-standing enemy of the Islamic Republic since the 1980s. Its leadership, many of whom have lived in exile in European countries like France and Albania, has frequently been the target of Iranian judicial actions, including repeated attempts to use INTERPOL to seek their arrest and extradition.

According to reports from Iranian judicial officials, including interviews published in Fars News Agency (May 2018) and Mehr News (January 2013), Iranian authorities have repeatedly requested Red Notices against MEK leaders, accusing them of terrorism and armed insurrection. However, these requests have consistently been rejected by INTERPOL, citing the political nature of the charges and their clear violation of Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution, which prohibits interventions of a political, military, religious, or racial character.

Despite these rejections, Iranian media frequently claims that MEK leaders are fugitives and should be internationally apprehended—an effort widely interpreted as part of the regime's propaganda machinery.

Regardless of whether the individuals in question have actually committed crimes in the context of military operations or political

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opposition, their consistent and overt engagement in anti-regime activities places them within the domain of political conduct. Therefore, any attempt to pursue them via INTERPOL—particularly through the issuance of Red Notices—constitutes a clear violation of Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, which explicitly forbids the organization from participating in matters of a political, military, religious, or racial nature. This prohibition exists precisely to prevent the abuse of international policing mechanisms for the suppression of political dissent and opposition.

This case highlights how authoritarian regimes may use INTERPOL not merely as a law enforcement tool, but as a method of political warfare—attempting to legitimize repression and criminalize organized dissent under the pretense of international justice.

Editor’s Note: This book makes no endorsement or support of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). Their inclusion in this chapter is solely for the purpose of documenting significant case studies involving the misuse of INTERPOL’s mechanisms. No comment is made—explicit or implied—on the organization’s internal structure, ideology, or activities. The analysis is limited strictly to the legal and procedural aspects of their targeting by the Iranian authorities through INTERPOL channels.

Silencing Satellite Voices

7. Shahram Homayoun (*L.A.-based media figure, Channel One TV*)

- **Date of Red Notice:** December 2009
- **Charges:** Incitement to commit anti-regime actions via satellite TV
- **Status:** Residing in the U.S.; extradition denied
- **Source:** ICIJ (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists)

Shahram Homayoun, an Iranian-American media figure and founder of *Channel One TV* in Los Angeles, became a vocal critic of the Islamic Republic through his satellite broadcasts, which reached millions of Iranians inside the country. His programmes, often political in tone, promoted civil disobedience, secular values, and exposed human rights abuses committed by the regime.

By 2009, his broadcasts had become particularly influential during the post-election unrest, offering a rare uncensored platform for dissidents, analysts, and opposition leaders in exile.

In December 2009, Iranian authorities requested a Red Notice from INTERPOL, accusing Homayoun of "inciting unrest and organising sedition." According to investigative reports by the International

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Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and references cited by Freedom House, the Iranian request was rejected by INTERPOL on the grounds that the charges were clearly political in nature and violated Article 3 of its Constitution. Freedom House has repeatedly cited Homayoun's case as an emblematic example of Iran's transnational censorship and intimidation campaign targeting journalists abroad.

Despite the rejection, Iranian media (IRIB) continues to frame Homayoun as a "wanted criminal," while state-linked outlets list his name among enemies of the Islamic Republic. This effort, however symbolic, reflects Iran's broader strategy of using global legal systems to delegitimize opposition voices abroad.

Iran's ongoing efforts to undermine Persian-language satellite channels—particularly those based in the United States—form part of a broader strategy to control the narrative and intimidate diaspora communities.

The Homayoun case illustrates how exile media can become targets of transnational repression—not through evidence-based criminal charges, but through the misapplication of international policing mechanisms for political gain.

According to disclosures made by the former Iranian police officer interviewed in this book, Shahram Homayoun has been sentenced to death by the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Iran on charges of “treason against the Islamic Revolution.” In addition to this capital sentence, several other convictions have reportedly been issued against him. This is precisely the kind of information that INTERPOL was not aware of at the time of the initial Red Notice request—and perhaps still remains unaware of. The danger lies not merely in the issuance of politically motivated Red Notices, but in the fact that INTERPOL’s mechanisms, when left unchecked, can be entrusted to authoritarian regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran—regimes that actively seek to transform legal instruments into tools of repression.

Beyond the initial Red Notice request, Mr Homayoun has reportedly faced persistent harassment, including online defamation campaigns, coordinated cyberattacks on his channel’s infrastructure, and indirect threats aimed at silencing his broadcasts. These efforts are not isolated; they form part of a broader pattern in which the Islamic Republic seeks to intimidate dissenting voices, discredit diaspora media platforms, and deter journalistic solidarity through fear, disruption, and reputational harm.

Such attacks are not merely reactive—they reflect a calculated long-term strategy. The regime understands that exile broadcasters serve

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as one of the few remaining bridges between the free world and the censored Iranian public. By undermining these voices, it aims to weaken public morale, fracture opposition cohesion abroad, and project a false image of invulnerability. In doing so, the Islamic Republic does not simply target individuals like Homayoun; it targets the very infrastructure of independent information.

Moreover, these tactics send a chilling message to other diaspora journalists: that distance offers no immunity. Whether through Red Notices, digital surveillance, or reputational sabotage, authoritarian regimes have learned to weaponize the openness of democratic societies against their own dissidents—turning freedoms into vulnerabilities.

Asylum vs. Abuse

8. Mehdi Khosravi (alias: Soroush)

- **Date of Red Notice:** August 2016
- **Charges:** Alleged embezzlement (widely seen as politically motivated)
- **Status:** Arrested in Italy, released; extradition denied due to asylum status
- **Source:** Council of Europe, Reuters

Political Asylum vs. Red Notice:

Mehdi Khosravi, also known by his alias “Soroush,” is a London-based Iranian political activist and former member of a reformist faction within the Islamic Republic. After defecting from the regime and openly criticizing its policies, he fled Iran and was later granted political asylum in the United Kingdom.

In August 2016, Khosravi was arrested in Italy based on a Red Notice issued by Iranian authorities. The charges involved alleged financial corruption—an accusation frequently used by the Iranian government to discredit dissidents abroad. However, after his arrest, Italian authorities examined the case and concluded that the charges were politically motivated.

According to a **Council of Europe** session brief and a **Reuters** report published in September 2016, Khosravi was released and the extradition request denied, as it violated international conventions on political asylum and due process. The case was cited in discussions within European institutions as a clear example of how authoritarian states misuse international policing to pursue political opponents.

This case demonstrates the delicate balance between international law enforcement cooperation and the protection of human rights. It also underscores the need for more effective screening mechanisms at

INTERPOL to distinguish between genuine criminal pursuits and political vendettas.

Targeting a Beauty Queen

9. Bahareh Zare Bahari *(former beauty queen, regime critic)*

- **Date of Red Notice:** 2018
- **Charges:** Alleged assault with a weapon (believed to be fabricated)
- **Status:** Detained in the Philippines, later granted asylum
- **Source:** The Guardian, November 9, 2019

Bahareh Zare Bahari, an Iranian beauty queen and outspoken regime critic, made international headlines in 2019 when she was detained in the Philippines at Manila Airport under a Red Notice reportedly requested by Iranian authorities.

Bahari, who had been living in the Philippines for several years and was representing the country in international beauty contests, denied the charges, claiming they were fabricated and politically motivated due to her activism and support for Iranian opposition figures. Iranian authorities accused her of assault with a deadly weapon—an

allegation that raised skepticism given its timing and lack of corroborating evidence.

According to The Guardian (November 2019) and Philippine immigration records, Bahari sought asylum in the Philippines, and the Department of Justice ultimately rejected Iran's extradition request, citing the political nature of the charges.

Her case drew support from human rights groups who condemned Iran's use of INTERPOL as a tool to punish dissidents abroad. Though the Red Notice was eventually dismissed, the damage to Bahari's reputation and freedom was already done.

This case again illustrates the dangers of weaponizing Red Notices for political retaliation, particularly against women who challenge the gender-based oppression of authoritarian states.

From IRIB to Red Notice

10. Seyed Mohammad Hosseini (*Leader of the opposition group Restart*)

- **Date of Red Notice:** 2019
- **Charges:** Encouraging violent resistance against the regime
- **Status:** Residing in the U.S.; not extradited

- **Source:** Rokna News, 2019

Seyed Mohammad Hosseini is a U.S.-based Iranian activist and the founder of the controversial opposition movement *Restart*. Before becoming a dissident, he spent years as a prominent figure within the very system he would later challenge—working as a television host and presenter for numerous entertainment and cultural programmes on Iran’s state-run broadcaster, IRIB.

His shift from a state media personality to an anti-regime activist was dramatic and public. Through his social media platforms, Hosseini called for civil disobedience, criticized the regime’s ideological foundations, and openly targeted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His content, often provocative and theatrical, gained traction among frustrated Iranian youth but also drew intense hostility from the Islamic Republic.

In 2019, the Iranian authorities issued a Red Notice request via INTERPOL, accusing Hosseini of inciting terrorism and orchestrating violent acts against the state. Iranian judiciary officials, as reported by Rokna News and ISNA, described his movement as a security threat and labeled him the head of a "subversive cult." Nevertheless, INTERPOL rejected the request, citing Article 3 of its Constitution, which forbids involvement in matters of a political or religious nature.

Despite this, Iranian media continued to broadcast his name as part of “international criminal lists,” attempting to frame him not as a political opponent but as a dangerous offender.

This case reflects a common tactic used by authoritarian regimes: transforming former insiders into high-priority enemies once they defect—and weaponizing international institutions to pursue them beyond borders.

Corruption or Retaliation?

11. Marjan Sheikholeslami Al-Agha (*economic corruption case, wife of Mehdi Khalaji*)

- **Date of Red Notice:** 2019
- **Charges:** Embezzlement in a major petrochemical scandal
- **Status:** Based in Canada; not extradited
- **Source:** PANA News, 2019

She was one of the figures associated with the so-called “Petrochemical Corruption Case” in Iran. The Iranian judiciary accused her of embezzling hundreds of millions of euros as part of a broader case involving officials in the petrochemical industry.

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In 2019, the Iranian authorities issued a Red Notice request through INTERPOL to locate and extradite Sheikholeslami, who was living in Canada at the time. Her case attracted widespread attention due to her marital connection to Mehdi Khalaji, a U.S.-based political analyst and known critic of the Islamic Republic, which raised suspicions that her prosecution may have had political undertones.

According to PANA News Agency (March 2019) and additional Iranian judicial sources, she was labeled a fugitive and targeted for international arrest. However, Canada did not act on the Red Notice.

Although unconfirmed, some reports have claimed that Sheikholeslami died in exile in Canada. However, no official confirmation has been provided, and she remains publicly listed as living abroad.

Critics argue that while financial corruption is a genuine issue in Iran, it is also frequently weaponized to settle political scores. Some human rights observers noted the timing of Sheikholeslami's prosecution and the media's emphasis on her marriage as potentially indicative of political motivations behind the charges.

Her case reflects the murky space where real economic crimes and political agendas intertwine, raising critical questions about

transparency and selective justice in the Iranian legal system—and the role of INTERPOL in such politically charged cases.

Editor’s Note: This case study is included solely to illustrate the potential overlap between political motivations and financial charges in the context of Red Notice abuse. This book takes no position on the personal guilt or innocence of the individual mentioned.

The Dissident Singer

12. Amirhossein Maghsoudlou (Amir Tataloo) (*controversial musician and internet figure*)

- **Date of Red Notice:** January 2020
- **Charges:** Promoting immorality, drug use, and blasphemy
- **Status:** Arrested in Istanbul; extradition denied by Turkey; voluntarily returned to Iran and sentenced to death in January 2025
- **Source:** Iran International, April 16, 2025

A Red Notice for a Singer! Amirhossein Maghsoudlou, known to millions as *Amir Tataloo*, is perhaps one of the most polarizing figures in the Persian-speaking world. An internet phenomenon, rebellious music icon, and outspoken cultural agitator, his artistic

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career frequently collided with the ideological red lines of the Islamic Republic.

In January 2020, Tataloo was arrested at Istanbul Airport while preparing to board a flight to London. The arrest, as later confirmed by the Chief of Iran’s International Police (NAJA) during a press appearance, was based on an active Red Notice issued by the Iranian authorities through INTERPOL. Iranian officials accused Tataloo of “promoting immorality,” “insulting religious sanctities,” and “encouraging drug use”—a mix of criminal and ideological charges long used by the regime against public dissenters.

Following his arrest, Iranian state media confidently reported that he would soon be extradited. However, after several weeks in detention, Turkish authorities released Tataloo and rejected the extradition request. Despite his release, the incident severely restricted his freedom of movement. He made several attempts to obtain a second passport—most notably from Dominica—but immigration advisors and legal consultants swiftly declined to process his case, knowing that no country would grant citizenship to an individual previously subjected to a Red Notice.

Tataloo eventually returned to Iran voluntarily in late 2024, where he was immediately arrested upon arrival. In 2025, he was sentenced to death on charges of “corrupting youth” and “insulting religious

values,” according to Iran International (April 16, 2025). His repeated public apologies and televised pleas for forgiveness—where he renounced his political views and sought clemency—were met with complete silence from the judiciary. No leniency was granted.

Iran’s police authorities, alongside media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), repeatedly claimed in various interviews that “we made Tataloo return voluntarily,” and warned that similar tactics would be used against any individual who opposes or criticizes the Islamic Revolution. They frequently boasted of possessing significant international leverage and emphasized that such influence would continue to be used in pursuit of the ideological goals of the Islamic Republic.

Moreover, Iran’s Legal Medicine Organization officially confirmed that Tataloo suffers from bipolar disorder, a diagnosis that in most legal systems would constitute a basis for mitigating punishment. But in this case, even mental illness could not save him from the full weight of state reprisal.

Tataloo’s case underscores a deeply alarming trend: that ideological nonconformity, when paired with mass influence, is perceived by the regime as a threat great enough to warrant international pursuit, suppression of movement, and ultimately, capital punishment.

Symbol of a Broken System

As I was writing this section about Tataloo—a singer whose songs have left an undeniable imprint on Persian music—I found myself laughing out loud.

You might ask: Why? The answer is painfully clear. A system that failed to exempt even a singer with millions of followers—one who, at the time of his arrest, was arguably more popular and influential than any other Iranian artist, and who had openly criticized the regime through both his music and online presence—from a Red Notice request...

How could such a system ever be expected to act fairly when dealing with individuals like the victim in this case?

Individuals who are far less known, who may have once served as a ex officer or security office worker, or who remain entirely anonymous to the public.

To presume that justice would prevail for them—when it did not for a world-renowned figure—is not only unrealistic. It is dangerously naïve.

These twelve cases represent only a fraction of the Iranian regime's attempts to weaponize the Red Notice system. If one were to comprehensively document every instance—whether officially

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recorded or reported by the victims themselves—it would require an entire volume dedicated solely to this subject. Yet, for the purpose of exposing this orchestrated campaign of transnational repression disguised as global justice, we believe the examples presented here are sufficient and clearly.

Red Notices for Revenge

As part of this chapter, we present an excerpt from an interview with a former Iranian police officer, whose testimony offers deeply revealing insights intended for the awareness of INTERPOL and its Commission for the Control of Files (CCF). What follows is not speculative—it is the voice of someone who operated inside the system and saw its inner workings firsthand.

Q: During your extended career in various branches of Iran's police force, did you ever witness attempts to misuse the Red Notice system—not just for political or state-driven purposes, but for personal vendettas, private gain, or administrative corruption?

What followed was one of the most bitter, unsettling smiles I have ever seen on a human face. He responded:

"Unfortunately, yes. And I will tell you all of them."

"I witnessed these cases up close. I was there."

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1. I personally witnessed a case in which a well-known public figure used his influence and personal ties to the head of police to escalate a private civil dispute into a fabricated criminal charge. He manipulated the judiciary by exploiting his fame and political reach, and eventually succeeded in initiating a Red Notice against the opposing party—someone who had simply disagreed with him over a financial matter.
2. In another case, a high-ranking regime official used the Red Notice system for a personal vendetta. His 24-year-old daughter had eloped with her boyfriend to Turkey because the father refused to allow them to marry. Instead of accepting the situation, he falsely reported the boyfriend for kidnapping and registered the daughter as a missing person—despite the fact that she had left the country willingly, through an official airport, using her own passport. There was no sign of coercion. Yet a Red Notice was issued.
3. I also witnessed a senior figure in a government agency initiate a Red Notice against someone to whom he had sold a piece of land years earlier. The dispute was entirely civil in nature, but he abused his connections in the police and judiciary to classify it as a criminal matter. And the system complied.

4. Perhaps the most disturbing case I recall was that of a high-level Iranian official whose son had murdered someone and fled the country. Rather than face consequences, the father used his status to block any Red Notice from being filed. He paid a high price to silence the victim's family through threats and financial pressure. After eleven months, the family was coerced into granting full forgiveness. The son returned to Iran, spent only two weeks in custody—not in prison, but inside a police facility—and was then released under a conditional pardon.

"And there are many more. I am always ready to speak about these realities—but not superficially. These are not just anecdotes. Each of them could fill an entire book. Each one exposes a dark, fragile corner of how human rights protections have failed in Iran—and how that failure has extended into the international systems meant to prevent such abuse."

A Pattern of Political Abuse

The documented actions of authoritarian regimes around the world expose a coordinated pattern of abuse: politically motivated arrests disguised as criminal matters, the use of Red Notices to trigger international detention, targeting of dissenters, and systemic exploitation of Interpol's procedural weaknesses.

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Among them, the Islamic Republic of Iran stands out as the only regime that has publicly admitted to using Interpol for political and military retaliation — as demonstrated by its 2021 request for a Red Notice against then–U.S. President Donald Trump.

Despite such admissions, Iran continues to receive uninterrupted access to Interpol’s full range of services.

These patterns reveal a structural failure: a global policing system originally designed to capture real criminals has, in many cases, been transformed into a weapon for silencing political opposition.

Perhaps the clearest example of political exploitation comes from Iran itself. Its 2021 Red Notice request against a sitting U.S. president was not cloaked in secrecy or subtle manipulation—it was an open, unapologetic act of retribution under the guise of legal process. Iranian judicial authorities not only justified the move domestically, but broadcast it as a legitimate legal measure through state-controlled media.

And yet, despite this brazen violation of Interpol’s core principles, the Islamic Republic continues to operate as a normal member state, with full access to the global policing infrastructure.

The twelve case studies presented in this chapter collectively expose a chilling pattern: the calculated misuse of Interpol's Red Notice

system by the Islamic Republic of Iran. From former presidents of foreign nations—including Donald Trump, who remains a central figure in American politics and u.s president today—to beauty queens, singers, exiled journalists, and asylum seekers, the spectrum of individuals targeted reveals one undeniable truth: this is not about justice. It is about fear. It is about control.

And even if one sets aside the question of whether all these individuals were politically or religiously persecuted, the deeper question remains: why is such a powerful global enforcement mechanism entrusted to a regime with a known history of legal manipulation, in the absence of strict oversight and accountability?

What these cases make abundantly clear is that Red Notices, in the hands of authoritarian regimes, can become tools of political retribution, rather than instruments of law enforcement. The Iranian regime's ability to reach across borders, to harass and intimidate its critics under the cover of international legality, is a dark stain on the global justice system.

Perhaps most concerning is the adaptive strategy used by Iran over time. Initially, it submitted politically charged Red Notices. When those failed, it shifted to accusations of corruption, drug promotion, and vague associations with unrest or terrorism. More recently, the regime has escalated its efforts through fabricated and imaginative

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criminal charges. In light of recent operations conducted in neighbouring countries that appear democratic, Iran seems to have achieved significant results by combining these Red Notices with covert diplomatic pressure.

These are not isolated abuses. A simple scan of the CCF's backlog reveals dozens of similar complaints—not just against Iran, but against multiple authoritarian states that exploit Interpol's legal tools for political gain. In this context, the danger is no longer just about the approval or rejection of a Red Notice. It is about **Iran's ongoing access to this system**, which enables it to monitor, identify, and track its critics abroad under the guise of international law.

A single Red Notice is enough to uncover an exiled dissident's country of residence. In many cases, that alone is all a regime like Iran needs. And when that information is obtained through a channel wrapped in the language of international cooperation and human rights, the contradiction becomes impossible to ignore.

The global system speaks the language of rights. But too often, it hands its tools to those who speak the language of repression.

This regime has a long-standing record of carrying out brutal assassinations. If it perceives any threat, it may directly use the information of dissidents obtained through INTERPOL to orchestrate

their elimination—a tactic it has repeatedly employed in recent years, despite the international community’s rhetoric on security and human rights.

“This facts alone proves a disturbing reality: Interpol, knowingly or not, remains complicit by continuing to serve regimes that openly violate its core constitutional rules.”



Chapter 8

The Silent Enablers

Enabling Through Silence

Behind every politically motivated Red Notice lies not only a regime determined to silence dissent, but also a system that permits it—through omission, complacency, or silent cooperation.

For authoritarian states to succeed in transforming international legal instruments into tools of domestic repression, someone—somewhere—must choose to look away.

This chapter is drawn from the continued testimony of a former Iranian criminal police officer, whose deep understanding of both Iran’s internal security mechanisms and international policing systems offers rare insight. His account is supplemented by independent research and open-source documentation, providing a

layered perspective on how international complicity—whether passive or active—allows injustice to travel freely across borders.

We now turn our attention to the quiet enablers:

Countries, corporations, institutions, and global systems that, whether by cooperation, indifference, or institutional inertia, allow authoritarian regimes like Iran's to exploit Interpol and other transnational structures for political gain.

A. Blind Enforcement Abroad

In many cases, countries that receive politically motivated Red Notices treat them as legitimate by default. Border guards, immigration officials, and even local police often assume that a notice from Interpol means the subject is dangerous or criminal. This automatic trust is dangerous. It results in the arrest or detention of dissidents who are in fact victims of state persecution.

Examples include dissidents arrested in European airports, visa denials based on unfounded notices, and long-term travel bans with no due process. Few countries have implemented clear policies to screen Red Notices for political motives before enforcement.

B. Security Ties, Silent Risks

Some governments cooperate with authoritarian states by sharing surveillance data or immigration intelligence. For example, leaked

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documents have shown that Iran and some other countries have received informal cooperation from European states and regional police networks. Sometimes, it's not direct aid but the failure to protect targets that makes this possible.

There are cases where asylum seekers in supposedly safe countries were surveilled, harassed, or even abducted because their host country shared information with regimes under the banner of security cooperation.

C. Outsourced Repression

Airlines, travel booking systems, and border security technologies are also implicated in enforcing Red Notices. Many use automated Interpol data feeds to alert staff about flagged individuals. This means an Interpol abuse can lead to being denied boarding or entry without any human legal judgment.

Some software companies integrate Interpol watchlists into their identity verification products, often without mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of the data—effectively outsourcing state repression to the private sector.

Notable Examples: Private Systems That Amplify Interpol Abuse.

Several well-known international companies and platforms have, intentionally or unintentionally, contributed to the automatic

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enforcement of Red Notices—without clear mechanisms for due process or human review.

1. IATA (International Air Transport Association)

As a global aviation body, IATA maintains data exchange protocols that connect airline systems with international watchlists, including those provided by INTERPOL. Airlines often rely on these integrations to flag high-risk passengers, potentially denying boarding based solely on Red Notice alerts, even in the absence of legal justification.

Source: Privacy International report on airline data-sharing practices, February 2021.

2. Amadeus & Sabre

These are two of the world's leading global distribution systems (GDS) for airline reservations. Their platforms are frequently integrated with government and law enforcement data feeds. When a Red Notice is uploaded to INTERPOL's secure communication system (I-24/7), alerts may propagate into these systems, prompting staff or automated software to take action against flagged individuals—regardless of the political nature of the notice.

Source: Statewatch briefing on EU travel databases and law enforcement access, June 2022.

3. Schengen Information System (SIS)

In the European Union, the SIS is one of the largest and most influential cross-border information-sharing tools. While not directly part of INTERPOL, it is often synchronized with Red Notice data through bilateral agreements. In many cases, a Red Notice triggers an automatic alert within SIS, leading to real-time surveillance, border detention, or refusal of entry—often without any review of the case’s political context.

Source: European Parliament report on SIS and political misuse concerns, October 2020.

4. Identity Verification Software Providers

Companies offering KYC (Know Your Customer) or ID verification tools—used in banks, crypto platforms, and visa processing—may also integrate INTERPOL’s public databases. Examples include Onfido, IDnow, and Jumio. These platforms rarely distinguish between criminal and political Red Notices, thereby enabling private-sector complicity in state-led persecution.

Source: Amnesty Tech investigation into surveillance integration in ID systems, March 2023.

D. The Cost of Inaction

Diplomatic silence is perhaps the most insidious form of enabling. Many Western governments have publicly committed to human rights but are unwilling to challenge Red Notices politically. They rely on Interpol's internal review system, which is slow and non-transparent.

This hands-off approach allows authoritarian governments to manipulate the system, confident that few will push back. Even when abuses are obvious, diplomatic statements are rare—and sanctions against abusers are almost nonexistent.

It is, however, genuinely encouraging to observe that in recent years, several free and democratic nations have chosen to disregard politically motivated, unfounded, or suspicious Red Notices—particularly those issued by authoritarian regimes, with Iran at the forefront.

Such principled inaction is not only commendable, but also worthy of recognition. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and a handful of others have demonstrated a responsible and rights-based approach in this regard.

E. Selective Rule of Law

The international legal order often functions with a double standard: politically influential countries and allies are treated differently than isolated or targeted regimes. While countries like Iran might face mild scrutiny, others enjoy quiet immunity.

This selective enforcement undermines global justice and emboldens those who learn to game the system. The rule of law becomes not a shield for the vulnerable, but a weapon for the powerful—wielded by proxy through global institutions.

Quiet Complicity

It's not just dictators who exploit Interpol—it's the whole network of silence that makes it possible. From governments who fail to investigate, to private firms that automate injustice, to international bodies that hesitate to confront their own failures—complicity is often systemic and quiet.

To fix this, reforms must go beyond Interpol itself. Host countries must adopt review mechanisms. International agencies must track and report abuses. And civil society must shine light into the shadows—because silence, too, is a form of violence.

Even if INTERPOL itself fails to implement meaningful reforms, national police forces in concerned countries can still take

independent steps.

It would require little effort to establish internal procedures that distinguish politically motivated Red Notices from legitimate criminal alerts.

Likewise, national courts and parliaments in free and democratic countries—faced with the repeated assaults of authoritarian regimes like Iran against their critics, including harassment and persecution through international channels such as INTERPOL—can and should enact strict and enforceable laws to prevent the unintentional cooperation of their own judicial and security systems with such regimes.

These measures would serve as a necessary safeguard against the exploitation of good-faith legal systems by states that openly violate the very principles of justice and human rights.

“The tools already exist—what’s missing is the political will or the resolve of the judiciary to use them.”

Chapter 9

Resistance and Reform

Breaking the Silence

In the shadowy corridors of international justice, resistance can be difficult—but it is not impossible. Over the past decade, lawyers, journalists, activists, and survivors have increasingly refused to accept the abuse of Interpol as inevitable. This chapter shines a light on the growing network of reformers working to hold the system accountable and defend those unjustly targeted.

1. Legal and Media Resistance

While politicians often hesitate and institutions tend to protect themselves, journalists have remained one of the few forces willing to confront the abuse of global policing mechanisms. In the absence of transparency within INTERPOL, investigative journalism has filled the vacuum—acting as both a watchdog and a pressure valve.

These stories go beyond headlines.

They build public empathy by putting a human face on abstract systems.

When a reader sees the face of a persecuted activist barred from boarding a plane, or hears the voice of a refugee detained at a European or Global border because of a fabricated Red Notice, injustice becomes real—personal—urgent.

Media coverage from credible sources like **The Guardian, Der Spiegel, BBC News, BBC Persian, Iran International (English and Persian), Radio Farda, Channel One, Manoto TV, Al Jazeera, VOA Persian, Kayhan London, IranWire, Radio Zamaneh, Index on Censorship, Just Security, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Journal of Democracy and many other reputable media** outlets that have courageously exposed the misuse of INTERPOL by authoritarian regimes has done more than inform; it has catalyzed:

- Parliamentary hearings in democratic countries about Red Notice abuse.
- Legal challenges that have led to individual Red Notices being deleted.

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- And public pressure campaigns that have forced INTERPOL to revise its communications and policies.

This collective journalistic effort deserves profound recognition. In an era where silence is often mistaken for neutrality, their investigative work has actively disrupted cycles of repression.

By exposing the hidden pathways of abuse and amplifying the voices of those silenced by authoritarian regimes, these media institutions have become essential actors in the global pursuit of justice. Their contribution is not merely informational—it is transformational. It holds systems accountable, challenges complicity, and reaffirms the press's role as a guardian of truth.

But journalists have not stood alone in this effort.

Legal scholars, whistleblowers, and human rights advocates have joined the resistance—forming a growing international network committed to reforming INTERPOL from within and without. Among these voices, several stand out not just for their criticism, but for their constructive legal strategies and institutional pressure.

◆ **Emmanuel Berman** – A French legal expert widely regarded as one of the leading independent authorities on INTERPOL. His academic research has revealed deep constitutional and legal inconsistencies in INTERPOL's operations. His work has been cited

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in parliamentary inquiries, legal defences, and has provided critical support to lawyers fighting politically motivated Red Notices.

◆ **Jago Russell** – Former CEO of *Fair Trials*, and one of the most prominent public advocates for Interpol reform. Under his leadership, Fair Trials spearheaded campaigns to improve transparency, fairness, and due process, pressuring INTERPOL to acknowledge its role in enabling abuse.

◆ **Bruno Min** – Senior Legal Advisor at *Fair Trials*, instrumental in crafting legal frameworks and policy recommendations to distinguish political persecution from genuine criminal prosecution. His legal analyses have directly contributed to successful challenges of abusive Red Notices.

◆ **Ted R. Bromund** – Senior Research Fellow at the *Heritage Foundation*, whose writings in *The Wall Street Journal*, *Foreign Policy*, and *The Hill* have called for greater accountability and conditional cooperation between democratic governments and INTERPOL. He has urged U.S. lawmakers to condition funding on institutional reform.

◆ **Ben Keith** – A leading UK-based barrister specializing in extradition law. He has defended multiple clients targeted by

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authoritarian states and testified before the UK Parliament on the political misuse of Red Notices.

This action is both commendable and courageous—undoubtedly reflecting a spirit of integrity and a deep concern for preserving international legal frameworks from exploitation by authoritarian regimes.

◆ **Yasha Maccanico** – Researcher at *Statewatch*, who has documented the dangerous overlap between INTERPOL data and EU systems like the Schengen Information System (SIS). His reports highlight the technocratic enforcement of politically biased alerts across European borders.

Together, these individuals have formed an informal but powerful coalition: lawyers who challenge Red Notices in court, academics who expose legal flaws, journalists who break the silence, and advocates who push for structural change.

In a system that depends on secrecy, exposure becomes a tool of resistance.

And when that exposure is backed not only by journalistic courage, but also by legal and academic expertise, the silence surrounding INTERPOL's unwitting complicity becomes harder and harder to maintain.

Naming the abusers—whether in an academic journal or on the front page of an international newspaper—**is no longer just reporting. It is accountability in action.**

2. Civil Society as Oversight

In the global push to reform INTERPOL, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent watchdogs have emerged as some of the most effective and persistent forces for change. Unlike diplomatic actors bound by political constraints, these civil society groups operate with a singular focus: to hold INTERPOL accountable when justice is undermined by politics.

Organizations such as **Fair Trials**, **Human Rights Watch**, and **Access Now** have led coordinated international campaigns to expose misuse, demand structural reforms, and assist victims of politically motivated Red Notices.

Their work takes many forms:

- They publish investigative reports that detail patterns of abuse by authoritarian regimes;
- They provide legal assistance to targeted individuals, including expert opinions and amicus briefs before courts;

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- They engage with policymakers, international organizations, and INTERPOL itself, advocating for clear legal standards and independent review mechanisms.

For example, Fair Trials has successfully campaigned for reforms within INTERPOL's Commission for the Control of Files (CCF)—the internal body responsible for reviewing Red Notices. The organization has also assisted defence teams in numerous high-profile cases, helping secure the removal of unjust notices and preventing wrongful extraditions.

Human Rights Watch, meanwhile, has documented specific cases in which INTERPOL notices were issued to silence human rights defenders, especially in countries with dictatorial regimes. Their reports have been used in legal proceedings and policy debates, reinforcing the argument that INTERPOL's tools are being weaponized.

Access Now, with its digital rights mandate, has focused on the intersection of surveillance, data exchange, and Red Notice enforcement. They have raised alarms about automated systems and private-sector databases that integrate unverified INTERPOL alerts—often without recourse for those targeted.

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In several cases, these organizations have helped courts dismiss extradition requests by proving the political nature of the charges, or by highlighting systemic failures in INTERPOL's review process. Their interventions have protected asylum seekers, exiled dissidents, and activists from persecution masked as prosecution.

Taken together, these NGOs represent an informal yet essential pillar of global oversight—one that continues to push back against the normalization of abuse within international law enforcement cooperation, and one that is truly deserving of profound and heartfelt gratitude.

They demonstrate that reform does not always begin from within.

Sometimes, it must be demanded from the outside—loudly, persistently, and without apology.

Precisely as demonstrated throughout this very book.

3. Voices of the Persecuted

Some of the most powerful reform efforts have come from the victims themselves. Exiled politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, and artists have refused to remain silent. Instead of accepting state abuse as their fate, they have chosen to fight back—through courts, international legal channels, and powerful public advocacy.

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These individuals have:

- Sued regimes that targeted them;
- Challenged politically motivated Red Notices through INTERPOL's Commission for the Control of Files (CCF);
- And used their personal platforms to expose injustice, mobilize support, and demand accountability.

Among the most well-known international cases are:

- **William Browder**, a British-American financier, led a global campaign against Russia's repeated misuse of Red Notices in retaliation for his anti-corruption work. His efforts resulted in several governments launching parliamentary inquiries and INTERPOL reforms.
- **Dolkun Isa**, a Uyghur human rights advocate, successfully forced INTERPOL to delete China's Red Notice against him, citing political persecution and lack of due process.

But resistance is not confined to the West. Iranian dissidents and regime targets have also stepped forward, achieving significant victories.

- **Bahareh Zare Bahari**, an Iranian beauty queen and human rights advocate, was detained in the Philippines in 2019 under a Red Notice issued by Iran. She resisted extradition, applied for asylum, and used her international platform to expose Iran's political motivations. In 2020, she was granted asylum—a rare and symbolic victory for an Iranian woman defying authoritarian pressure.
- **Shahram Homayoun**, an exiled journalist and opposition figure, was subjected to a Red Notice by Iran in 2009. The U.S. government refused to act on the request, citing its political nature. Homayoun continued his media work, and the case became a high-profile example of the need for scrutiny in Red Notice enforcement.

These stories show that resistance is not only possible—but sometimes, remarkably effective. They prove that even in exile, the silenced can speak, the hunted can resist, and in some cases, the persecuted can prevail.

4. Courts That Said No

Although not all judicial systems are responsive, certain landmark rulings—particularly in Europe—have pushed back against authoritarian misuse of Red Notices. These cases reveal that when

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national courts assert their independence, they can serve as a final line of defence against transnational repression.

One such precedent emerged in **Germany**, where a regional court ruled in favour of a Turkish dissident targeted by Ankara through INTERPOL. The court found that the Red Notice violated the individual's right to political asylum and freedom of expression, determining that the request was based not on criminal conduct, but on political opposition to President Erdoğan's government. The notice was declared incompatible with Germany's constitutional protections.

Similarly, in **Italy**, a Court of Appeal in Rome denied Iran's extradition request for a journalist who had openly criticized the regime. The Italian judge cited credible threats of torture and arbitrary detention, referencing evidence submitted by human rights organizations and testimonies from prior detainees. The court concluded that the charges were politically fabricated and that the use of INTERPOL was part of a broader campaign to silence dissent.

In **France**, the Conseil d'État—the country's highest administrative court—ruled against the extradition of a Russian national targeted via Red Notice, stating that compliance with the request would breach France's obligations under international refugee law. The court also

stressed that blind enforcement of Red Notices contradicts the principles of due process and fair trial.

Even in one of **Iran's neighbouring countries**, a recent example involves the very subject of this book—an Iranian dissident and victim of political persecution. The Iranian regime issued a Red Notice against him. However, after a thorough legal review and the presentation of credible, verifiable evidence, the judiciary correctly recognised the political nature of the Red Notice and ordered his immediate and unconditional release.

The victim, along with his family, was seeking a short tourist trip to recover from nearly a year of detention, torture, surgery, and psychological trauma. Their aim was simply to find some rest and relief from the long struggle they had endured.

Tragically, during what was intended to be a simple tourist trip, the victim was expelled at the border of the same neighbouring country of Iran in which he had been residing. This expulsion occurred at the point of departure, while he was en route to another country for a planned vacation. Shockingly, it took place despite a final and non-appealable ruling from that nation's High Court explicitly prohibiting his expulsion. The judgment clearly stated that under no circumstances should such an action be taken in relation to this

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individual—yet the immigration authorities proceeded with his removal.

What began as an ordinary tourist journey suddenly turned into the most devastating form of exile he had ever experienced. Not because of the travel destination itself—but because he never expected such an outcome and was entirely unprepared. He had placed full trust in the rule of law in that country and never imagined that a court ruling of such legal finality could be ignored so brazenly.

Even more distressing, in the final moments before departure, the expulsion was extended to his entire family. Without warning, all of them were forcibly removed to the same destination country—originally chosen for leisure—under the conditions of a forced expulsion rather than voluntary travel and He was subsequently subjected to a permanent ban on re-entry into that country!

Yet, in stark contrast to the judiciary's ruling, certain state institutions within that country—including internal security agencies and immigration authorities—pursued an opposing course of action. Despite a clear non-refoulement ruling from the High Court, which explicitly acknowledged the risk to the victim's life if returned to Iran, these bodies persistently attempted to deport him. Fortunately, their efforts with the intention of returning him to Iran were ultimately unsuccessful.

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Perhaps more troublingly, some internal security forces even refused to comply with legal orders from the country's highest administrative and judicial bodies. It was not until a state prosecutor intervened that minimal institutional accountability began to take shape.

This case exemplifies a disturbing reality: politics often overrides the law. And yet, it also offers a critical lesson—when one raises their voice firmly against the supremacy of politics over justice, the possibility of legal victory still exists.

These rulings, though isolated, carry systemic implications. They establish a growing body of legal precedents that future courts can rely upon. Most importantly, they signal to authoritarian regimes that international policing tools are not immune to judicial scrutiny, and that democratic institutions are willing to draw a line when abuse becomes evident.

An official translation of the court's ruling is provided on the following page, with appropriate redactions to protect the identities of those involved. However, despite this clear order from the Administrative Court, the victim—along with his family—was unfortunately deported to the country they had initially chosen as their tourist destination.

CASE NO : [REDACTED]
DECISION NO : [REDACTED]

on the grounds that he was wanted under a red notice

due to the claimant being

principle that "A citizen shall not be deported", [REDACTED]

in accordance with the law [REDACTED]

case be overturned.

5. The Reformer Within

In response to mounting international pressure, INTERPOL has shown some gestures toward reform. These include clarifying the limitations of Article 3, improving its complaint review mechanisms through the Commission for the Control of Files (CCF), and rejecting a number of politically motivated Red Notice requests.

Yet critics argue that these efforts fall far short of meaningful change. Transparency remains inadequate. Victims still endure severe delays. And abusive regimes continue to enjoy full membership and privileges.

In practice, it is abundantly clear that no substantial or structural reform has yet been implemented to prevent authoritarian regimes from issuing Red Notices against innocent individuals. This reality is deeply alarming.

In a world where surveillance technology transcends borders and authoritarian powers increasingly exploit international legal tools for political repression, every day of delay in reforming INTERPOL may cost an innocent person their freedom—or even their life.

The fight for reform continues—and this time, civil society is leading the charge.

From Silence to Reform

Despite the immense risks faced by those who stand up to authoritarian regimes, resistance remains the most potent catalyst for reform. The system will not correct itself. It is only through exposure, litigation, advocacy, and persistence that cracks begin to form in the armor of institutional complicity.

In recent years, public investigations, media exposés, and landmark court rulings have revealed what many suspected all along: INTERPOL is not immune to abuse. Its mechanisms, if left unchecked, can and have been manipulated by regimes that weaponize legality to pursue political opponents across borders.

Human rights organizations like Fair Trials, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International have consistently warned that unless INTERPOL is subjected to democratic oversight, it will remain a tool vulnerable to authoritarian misuse. They have documented numerous cases in which innocent individuals were arrested, detained, or placed under surveillance due to Red Notices issued in bad faith.

Yet, despite this growing body of evidence, structural reform has been painfully slow. Internal resistance within INTERPOL, lack of political will among member states, and the strategic silence of democratic governments—often driven by economic or geopolitical interests—have hindered real progress.

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This silence is not neutral. **It empowers abusers.** Every instance in which a democratic state honours a politically motivated Red Notice without scrutiny reinforces the legitimacy of repression. Every failure to speak out is an endorsement of silence over justice.

But when individuals, organizations, and institutions choose to break that silence, when they demand transparency, challenge abuses, and refuse to be complicit, real change becomes possible. The victories may be incremental, but they are cumulative—and they matter.

If the international community is sincere in its desire to preserve INTERPOL as a legitimate, rule-bound organization that serves the global good, it must actively support those who dare to expose its flaws and demand reform. This is not merely an administrative issue—it is a moral imperative.

Reform will never emerge from silence. It will only come from those who raise their voices, risk retaliation, and insist that justice must prevail—even when the system is designed to suppress it.

“This book, too, has been written and published with that very motivation in mind—to challenge silence, to expose the truth, and to make it clearer for the world to see.”

Chapter 10

Solutions and Safeguards

What Must Be Done?

Having exposed the misuse of Interpol and the harms it has inflicted, this book now turns to the essential question: what can be done?

Solutions must be more than symbolic—they must be structural, enforceable, and focused on prevention. Reforming the Red Notice system will require courage from Interpol itself, accountability from member states, and persistent pressure from civil society.

High-Risk Submissions

1. Automatic Presumption of Political Motive in Certain Regimes:

INTERPOL's default approach assumes that member states submit requests in good faith. This assumption, while perhaps reasonable in

theory, breaks down in the face of decades of documented abuse by certain regimes. Iran and other authoritarian regimes have repeatedly used INTERPOL for political repression, and their requests should not be processed without heightened scrutiny.

A starting point for reform is for INTERPOL to maintain a list of "high-risk member states" whose Red Notices are subjected to automatic legal and political review before publication. Trust must be earned—not presumed.

Without such safeguards, neutrality becomes an illusion—and justice, a privilege for the powerful.

Manual Review Mandate

2. Break the Automation: Manual Review for Abusive Regimes:

At present, many Red Notices are processed automatically or semi-automatically through INTERPOL's I-24/7 network. For countries with a history of abuse, this process must be interrupted. A designated review team—composed of legal, human rights, and asylum experts—should manually assess any requests before they are shared internationally.

This would not only increase fairness but protect INTERPOL itself from further reputational damage.

Beyond Resource Excuses

3. Stop Hiding Behind the Excuse of Limited Resources:

Victims who contact INTERPOL to challenge a Red Notice often receive generic letters stating that the organization has "limited resources" to review individual cases. Yet in many situations, even a five-minute glance at the documents provided would reveal the political motivation.

When an individual provides clear evidence—such as arrest warrants filled with ideological language or obvious contradictions—INTERPOL should have internal protocols that immediately suspend or flag the request until a full investigation is conducted.

Instead, many cases are left in limbo for months or even years, allowing the abuse to persist while INTERPOL hides behind administrative language.

Metrics for Accountability

4. Real Transparency and Public Oversight:

INTERPOL must publish annual statistics about Red Notices, including how many were deleted, how many were flagged for political content, and how many were appealed successfully. These metrics should be broken down by country of origin.

Without transparency, there can be no accountability.

International Legal Safeguards

5. Legal Protections for Victims:

INTERPOL should collaborate with the United Nations or the European Court of Human Rights to create binding international guidelines protecting the rights of individuals targeted by politically motivated notices.

Such individuals should have the right to a timely hearing, access to the full file used against them, and the ability to present exculpatory evidence.

Ensure File Transparency

6. Victims Silenced Twice: No Right to Know, No Right to Respond:

One of the most disturbing practices within INTERPOL is the organization's consistent refusal to provide victims with access to the files concerning their own cases. Even individuals who are the direct subject of a Red Notice are often denied any information—no copy of the request, no summary of the evidence, and no opportunity to respond meaningfully.

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This violates basic principles of international law and due process. It sends a chilling message: that INTERPOL prioritizes institutional convenience over individual rights.

What is most astonishing is that in almost every country, and within virtually every court or police institution around the world, the individual under pursuit—or their legal representative—has the right to access part or all of the evidence and documentation related to their case. This is a basic safeguard against injustice and a core element of due process.

Yet INTERPOL acts in direct violation of these universal legal protections. It operates above the law, withholding access from victims and denying them the opportunity to defend themselves—a practice that fundamentally contradicts international human rights standards.

For instance, in the case of the victim discussed by the former police officer, INTERPOL never provided him with any documentation—not even a copy of the Red Notice itself. Instead, he was met with vague responses such as “your case is under review,” or generic refusals citing “staff or budget limitations.” Repeated complaints filed by the victim against the intelligence and security apparatus of the host country—one of Iran’s neighbours—proved fruitless.

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It was only when a principled and conscientious prosecutor in one of the country's higher courts intervened and formally filed charges against the national security services that the victim was finally granted access to the documents he had a natural legal right to see.

Now imagine if that intervention had never occurred—he would have remained completely in the dark, denied all means of defence. This alone is a grave injustice, and it stands in direct contradiction to INTERPOL's own Constitution, which professes a commitment to due process and fairness.

This is not merely an external failure—it is a failure from within INTERPOL itself. And it exposes a glaring truth: the organization's lack of transparency is not incidental. It is systemic. It screams from the inside.

As the British historian **Lord Acton** famously warned:

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

And when an institution shields itself from scrutiny, ignores accountability, and claims exceptionalism, corruption is not a risk—it is a certainty—even if that corruption is unintentional and merely the consequence of authoritarian regimes exploiting a system built on the language and promise of human rights.

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In many documented cases, countries like Iran have managed to submit a four-line request to INTERPOL's system—without providing supporting documents, without offering evidence, and without the subject of the notice having any ability to defend themselves. And still, a Red Notice is issued.

The result? Victims suffer travel restrictions, employment consequences, banking freezes, and reputational harm for indefinite periods—sometimes years—with no one held accountable. Their lives are suspended, while bureaucracies delay justice.

There must be an independent international body tasked with monitoring INTERPOL and ensuring that its operations align with basic human rights standards. Full transparency must be the rule—not the exception.

After all, these are not murderers or thieves we're talking about. These are journalists, academics, artists, ex officer, and dissidents—often protected under the very principles of free speech enshrined in the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions—targeted by authoritarian regimes under false criminal pretenses.

Engage Insider Experts

7. Practical Reform Through Insider Expertise:

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INTERPOL could take meaningful and low-cost steps to prevent injustice—particularly in the case of the Iranian regime—by actively consulting former Iranian police officers, legal professionals, and individuals with direct experience inside Iran’s judicial system who now reside in human rights-respecting and safe countries, and who are familiar with the mechanics of Red Notices issued based on political motives, fabricated legal charges, personal vendettas, and corruption-driven incentives.

Such collaboration could lead to the development of a targeted, efficient mechanism to filter out abusive notices and prevent the misuse of INTERPOL as a systemic weapon.

Remarkably, many of these experts—including the former police officer interviewed in this book—have expressed willingness to contribute freely, without any financial expectation, motivated solely by a desire to prevent further victimization and uphold human rights.

This model could be extended to other authoritarian regimes as well, yielding practical and effective reforms with minimal financial burden to INTERPOL.

“The cost of inaction is not measured in material terms—but in shattered futures, stolen freedoms, and lives irreversibly scarred by injustice.”

Establish Independent Oversight

8. External Accountability Through Independent Monitoring:

To restore trust and prevent abuse, INTERPOL must no longer operate without external scrutiny. Establishing an independent oversight body—composed of international legal experts, human rights monitors, and representatives from neutral jurisdictions—would provide essential accountability, especially in politically sensitive cases.

Such a body could monitor Red Notice trends, investigate allegations of systemic misuse, and issue public reports with reform recommendations. Far from weakening INTERPOL, this external mechanism would strengthen its credibility, ensuring that justice is not only done but seen to be done.

Similar models already exist. The United Nations’ system of Special Rapporteurs is one example where independent, rights-based monitoring functions without infringing state sovereignty. INTERPOL’s global mandate deserves nothing less.

“Justice cannot thrive in silence and secrecy. It demands visibility. It demands accountability. And above all, it demands the courage to reform.”

Create Emergency Protocols

9. Immediate Protection for Victims at Risk:

When a Red Notice places an individual in immediate danger—especially in countries where authoritarian influence is strong—INTERPOL must not delay. The organization should adopt formal emergency intervention protocols that allow for the rapid suspension or review of politically motivated alerts when credible threats to life, liberty, or due process are identified.

These protocols should be activated automatically when a victim presents urgent evidence—such as a final death sentence, credible threats of torture, or evidence of previous political persecution. In such situations, delays are not just procedural failures; they may cost lives.

Fast-track protections exist in other international frameworks, including refugee law and emergency injunctions by regional human rights courts. INTERPOL must implement a similar safety valve—one that prioritizes human life over bureaucratic formality.

“As long as lives remain at stake, procedural slowness must never be an excuse.”

Mandate Timely Notification

10. Prompt Disclosure to Targeted Individuals:

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INTERPOL must require that individuals targeted by Red Notices are informed without delay. In many cases, victims are unaware of the notice until they are detained at borders, lose access to essential services, or suffer reputational harm. This violates basic principles of due process and strips individuals of their right to timely defence.

To prevent such harm, Red Notices should not remain hidden from the people they affect. Member states must be obligated to notify affected individuals immediately upon submission, and INTERPOL itself should provide a parallel confirmation through secure and confidential channels.

This basic notification right is a cornerstone of fair legal practice in most national and international systems. Denying it turns law enforcement into an instrument of surprise and fear—not justice.

“A right that cannot be exercised in time is no right at all.”

Impose Penalties for Abuse

11. Consequences for Systematic Misuse:

INTERPOL must introduce clear penalties for member states that repeatedly misuse the Red Notice system. Without consequences, abusive regimes have no incentive to stop submitting politically motivated requests—and victims continue to suffer under a system that protects the abuser more than the abused.

Penalties could include temporary suspension from submitting Red Notices, public naming in annual reports, or restricted access to certain INTERPOL databases. These deterrents would send a strong message: that systemic manipulation of international policing tools will not be tolerated.

Many international organizations—such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—already employ similar measures to enforce compliance and integrity. INTERPOL should adopt a comparable model to protect its credibility and prevent repeated abuse by high-risk regimes.

“When impunity becomes routine, injustice becomes policy.”

Require Non-Political Certification

12. Affirming Neutrality in Every Submission:

To preserve its constitutional commitment to neutrality, INTERPOL must require that all Red Notice requests be accompanied by an official non-political certification from the submitting country. This declaration should state—under legal liability—that the request is not based on political, military, religious, or racial grounds.

Such a requirement would raise the cost of false submissions by attaching responsibility to the sender. It would also provide a clear basis for holding governments accountable in cases of documented

abuse. The certification process must be formalized, documented, and subject to verification if questions arise.

International legal bodies, courts, and treaty-based institutions regularly require signatories to certify compliance with core principles. INTERPOL, as a global enforcement mechanism, must do the same to uphold the rule of law across borders.

“Neutrality is not a passive position—it is an active standard that must be enforced.”

Require Submission of Professional Background

13. Verifying Eligibility Through Occupational History:

To prevent politically motivated misuse, INTERPOL should require that any Red Notice request from a high-risk country include the professional background of the targeted individual. This would allow early screening to identify protected categories—such as journalists, authors, former military officers, political activists, or intelligence personnel—whose prosecution may violate INTERPOL’s Constitution, particularly Article 3.

This obligation would serve two critical purposes: first, it would deter member states from targeting individuals whose backgrounds make them ineligible for Red Notice circulation. Second, it would enable

INTERPOL to apply its neutrality standards more effectively, based on documented occupational context.

While regimes like Iran may submit false or misleading occupational data, such declarations would then become verifiable points of dispute. Once the targeted individual is informed of the notice, they can present concrete documentation of their actual background—such as employment history in media, academia, or public service. This would serve as strong, documented evidence of political motivation, strengthening their legal defence and reinforcing calls for deletion of the notice.

Failure to disclose accurate professional information should result in automatic rejection or delay of the request pending clarification. Requiring transparency at the point of submission creates an added layer of protection against abuse.

“When identities are hidden, injustice advances in silence. When professions are disclosed, abuse is stopped at the gate.”

Mandate State Accountability Statements

14. State-Level Acknowledgement of Responsibility:

INTERPOL should require that every Red Notice request from a member state be accompanied by a formal accountability statement. This document must include the name, title, and legal responsibility

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of the official authorizing the request—under national and international law.

Such a measure would eliminate the current practice of faceless, anonymous requests and ensure that each submission is traceable to a known authority. It would discourage frivolous or politically motivated notices by forcing state agents to assume personal and institutional responsibility for misuse.

Furthermore, this requirement would create a legal trail that could be referenced in international litigation or disciplinary action in cases of confirmed abuse. By attaching names to decisions, INTERPOL would uphold transparency, protect victims, and pressure authoritarian regimes to act within international norms.

“A signature brings with it responsibility—and responsibility is the first step toward justice.”

Establish a Victim Redress Mechanism

15. Compensation Framework for Wrongful Red Notices:

For those who have suffered due to wrongful Red Notices, the damage is often far more than symbolic—it is real, personal, and lasting. Victims lose jobs, freedom of movement, reputation, and even access to basic services such as banking and housing. Yet, to

date, there is no official framework for acknowledging or remedying these harms.

INTERPOL, in collaboration with the United Nations, regional human rights courts, or a designated international committee, should develop a victim redress mechanism. This would allow individuals wrongly targeted by politically motivated Red Notices to access various forms of restitution, including:

- Formal letters of apology or clearance
- Certificates confirming the deletion of the Red Notice
- Legal and public relations assistance to repair reputational harm
- And, where appropriate, financial compensation from responsible member states or international funds

Such a mechanism would send a powerful message: that the international community recognizes the cost of wrongful persecution and will not leave victims without recourse. It would also reinforce INTERPOL's commitment to justice and human rights, while deterring future abuses by making wrongful targeting not only shameful—but expensive.

“Justice is not served until the wounded are healed—not only with apologies, but with restoration.”

Implement Early-Warning Systems

16. Monitoring Repeat Violators through Predictive Oversight:

Some countries have demonstrated consistent patterns of abusing INTERPOL’s systems for political or retaliatory purposes. In many of these cases, their Red Notices are later deleted, flagged, or heavily contested. Yet, there is currently no formal mechanism within INTERPOL to identify or monitor such repeat offenders.

To prevent recurring misuse, INTERPOL should implement an early-warning system that combines data analytics and expert human review. This system would:

- Track deletion rates of Red Notices by country
- Flag repeated appeals from the same jurisdiction
- Identify nations that frequently target political opponents, exiled officials, or journalists

Once a country exceeds a predefined threshold of misuse, INTERPOL should impose provisional restrictions, including:

- Mandatory third-party review of all future notices

- Temporary suspension of direct access to automated notice systems
- Increased scrutiny by oversight bodies

By proactively identifying and responding to patterns of abuse, INTERPOL can better protect its systems and preserve the legitimacy of its mandate.

“Prevention is not just foresight—it is responsibility in action.”

Publish a Red Notice Watchlist

17. Public Disclosure of Politically Risky Red Notices:

Transparency is a cornerstone of justice. Yet, INTERPOL’s current practices operate largely in the shadows, especially when politically sensitive Red Notices are issued by authoritarian states. This opacity enables abuse, while silencing victims and shielding the perpetrators from scrutiny.

To address this, INTERPOL should publish a quarterly anonymized *Red Notice Watchlist*—a list of cases currently under review for potential political misuse. This list should include:

- The number of Red Notices under political review, broken down by country

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- General categories of allegations (e.g., espionage, sedition, “crimes against national security”)
- Statistical summaries of outcomes—such as how many were upheld, deleted, or voluntarily withdrawn

Such a system would not compromise sensitive legal data or individual privacy, but it would allow NGOs, media, and oversight institutions to track patterns of misuse and apply appropriate pressure.

Comparable models exist. For instance, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regularly publishes anonymized summaries of politically motivated cases it investigates, without naming individuals unless consent is given. INTERPOL could adapt this approach to balance transparency with confidentiality.

“Opacity breeds abuse; sunlight invites accountability.”

Pre-Alerts for Suspect Cases

18. Targeted Alerts in Non-Violent, Politically Motivated Red Notices:

In many politically sensitive cases, individuals discover the existence of a Red Notice only after severe consequences occur—such as airport detention, job loss, or frozen assets. While pre-notification is not feasible for serious criminal allegations like murder or terrorism,

it is both practical and essential in non-violent, politically motivated cases.

INTERPOL should adopt a **conditional pre-notification mechanism** that applies to Red Notices flagged for potential political abuse, especially where the alleged offence does not involve violence or threats to public safety. This system would:

- Notify the individual of the Red Notice's existence
- Provide basic information about the nature of the allegation
- Allow them to submit evidence or appeal before widespread enforcement begins

To safeguard against false alerts or misuse, such pre-notifications should only be issued after a preliminary review by INTERPOL's internal oversight body (such as the Commission for the Control of Files, or CCF) or a third-party human rights panel.

This limited and cautious approach respects the need for confidentiality in genuine criminal cases while offering a vital layer of protection to dissidents, journalists, whistleblowers, and other peaceful actors who are often wrongfully targeted.

“Injustice thrives in silence; even a whisper of warning can save a life.”

No Backdoor Cooperation

19. Restrict Intelligence Cooperation in Politically Motivated Cases:

INTERPOL should develop safeguards to prevent the misuse of cross-border intelligence sharing channels—such as I-24/7 or bilateral police cooperation—for politically motivated persecution. Even when a Red Notice is rejected or deleted, authoritarian regimes often continue to pursue dissidents using informal intelligence requests, secret “diffusions,” or back-channel communication through regional police agreements.

Such tactics bypass judicial oversight and violate the spirit of INTERPOL’s Constitution. Therefore, member states should be prohibited from engaging in intelligence exchanges related to individuals whose cases have been flagged or rejected due to political content.

Moreover, INTERPOL should require that any intelligence request related to fugitives include a formal certification of compliance with Article 3 (prohibition of political, military, religious, or racial interference), subject to independent review.

“When secrecy becomes a tool for vengeance, cooperation turns into complicity.”

Flag Public Dissidents

20. Maintain a Registry of Known Dissidents:

INTERPOL should coordinate with international human rights organizations, media watchdogs, and academic institutions to establish a non-political, verified registry of known public dissidents—including journalists, artists, human rights defenders, former officials, and political activists—especially those who have been exiled from authoritarian regimes.

When a Red Notice request is submitted, the system should automatically cross-check the name against this registry. If a match is found, the notice should be flagged for mandatory review before circulation.

Although this system cannot capture silent or underground dissidents, it would serve as a crucial firewall against the misuse of INTERPOL against visible critics—preventing countries from targeting journalists, authors, performers, or media figures under fabricated criminal charges.

A similar model exists in the form of protected journalist registries maintained by NGOs and press freedom groups. INTERPOL can adopt a neutral and rights-focused version without violating its apolitical mandate.

“Recognition is protection—visibility can be a shield.”

No Notice Without Evidence

21. Require Initial Evidentiary Disclosure Before Red Notice Issuance:

One of the most dangerous flaws in the current Red Notice system is that member states are not required to submit substantive evidence when making a request. A country can submit a brief, vague request—sometimes just a few lines—without attachments, proof, or legal reasoning, and still obtain a Red Notice.

To prevent abuse, INTERPOL must mandate that all Red Notice requests include a minimum evidentiary package, such as:

- A certified copy of the arrest warrant
- A summary of the charges and underlying facts
- Supporting documentation or witness statements
- A sworn declaration that the case is free of political or ideological motivation

Red Notices that fail to meet this minimum threshold should be automatically rejected or placed under review.

This simple requirement would dramatically reduce politically motivated notices and restore credibility to INTERPOL's processes.

“No one should be globally hunted without a shred of proof.”

The Cost of Inaction

If INTERPOL fails to implement structural reforms, it risks a profound identity crisis: transforming from a guardian of global justice into an instrument of political persecution. This is no longer a theoretical concern—it is a documented pattern. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with its longstanding record of manipulation, repression, and judicial corruption, continues to exploit INTERPOL's systems with near impunity. And it is not alone. Other authoritarian regimes have followed suit, emboldened by a lack of transparency, oversight, and political will.

The time for symbolic gestures has passed. Reform must be real, enforceable, and grounded in prevention.

Anything less will render INTERPOL unintentionally complicit—not truly impartial.

21-Point INTERPOL Reform Roadmap

The Twenty One proposals outlined in this chapter offer a roadmap:

- 1. Automatically subjecting Red Notices from high-risk regimes to political and legal review.**

- 2. Breaking automation through mandatory manual screening by independent experts.**
- 3. Rejecting bureaucratic excuses and establishing fast-response protocols when victims present clear evidence.**
- 4. Publishing transparent, country-specific statistics to enable external oversight.**
- 5. Creating international legal protections in partnership with credible human rights institutions.**
- 6. Ending secrecy and allowing victims meaningful access to their own case files.**
- 7. Engaging experts—including former insiders now living in safe, democratic countries—to design more resilient systems.**
- 8. Establish an independent international oversight body to monitor INTERPOL’s practices.**
- 9. Create emergency intervention protocols for victims facing imminent harm.**
- 10. Mandate prompt notification to individuals targeted by Red Notices.**

- 11. Impose penalties on member states that repeatedly misuse the system.**
- 12. Require official non-political certification with every Red Notice request.**
- 13. Require submission of occupational history for all Red Notice requests from high-risk regimes to screen for politically protected professions.**
- 14. Mandate that each Red Notice be signed by a named official who accepts legal responsibility for its accuracy.**
- 15. Establish a victim redress mechanism offering apologies, legal support, and compensation for wrongful notices.**
- 16. Develop an early-warning system to flag countries with repeated misuse and impose temporary restrictions.**
- 17. Publish anonymized quarterly summaries of politically sensitive Red Notices under review.**
- 18. Implement pre-notification alerts for individuals targeted in non-violent and politically flagged cases.**
- 19. Ban the use of informal intelligence channels in cases already flagged or rejected for political abuse.**

20. Create a registry of known dissidents to automatically flag politically risky Red Notice requests.

21. Require submission of basic evidence and a sworn non-political declaration with every Red Notice request.

None of these solutions are radical. They are reasonable, practical, and in many cases cost-neutral. Some of them—such as creating expert review panels or enhancing transparency—require only administrative will, not legislative overhaul.

But without these reforms, the consequences are devastating. Victims of abusive Red Notices—journalists, dissidents, artists, academics, and former military whistleblowers—will continue to suffer detention, travel bans, asset freezes, reputational damage, and long-term trauma, often without ever having the chance to defend themselves.

More disturbingly, INTERPOL’s credibility as a neutral and impartial institution will continue to erode, replaced by justified suspicion and diminished cooperation from human rights-conscious nations.

To preserve INTERPOL’s legitimacy, the organization must confront its contradictions. Trust must no longer be automatic. Processes must no longer be invisible. And abusers must no longer be accommodated.

**“Justice cannot thrive in silence and secrecy.
It demands visibility.**

It demands accountability.

And above all, it demands the courage to reform.”



Chapter 11

Conclusion & Call to Action

Origins of Operation Redlist

What this book has laid bare is not a mere collection of isolated incidents.

It is a pattern—a structure—deliberately exploited by regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran, using international institutions as tools of oppression beyond their borders.

We call this systematic operation—replicated by other authoritarian regimes as well:

“Operation Redlist.”

According to disclosures made by the former Iranian police officer interviewed in this book, this operation has been internally recognised within the Islamic Republic’s security and

governmental systems under the same name: *Operation Redlist*—or, as referred to in Persian, “Amaliat-e List-e Ghermez”.

What began as a covert domestic initiative has now evolved into a transnational strategy—weaponizing international policing mechanisms to target dissidents abroad.

We have shown how INTERPOL’s Red Notice system, meant to serve justice, has been hijacked to pursue vengeance. We have documented how critics, journalists, and even political leaders have become targets—not for what they have done, but for who they are and what they represent.

This is no longer about technical reform. It is about moral clarity.

No regime that uses torture, executes dissidents, or criminalizes thought should ever be allowed to weaponize global law enforcement systems under the banner of neutrality.

Even under the principle of fair trial, it must be unequivocally stated that no regime or court—under any legal system—has the right to prosecute former political dissidents or ex-military whistleblowers—or even a genuinely accused individual—through an unfair or in absentia trial.

If such actions result from systemic corruption or institutional bias, those regimes must not be allowed to exploit international

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mechanisms—such as INTERPOL—to advance their illegitimate objectives.

And even in the event that such regimes succeed in circumventing international safeguards, the bare minimum required by justice is that the accused be granted full access to their case file and afforded the opportunity to defend themselves under conditions that adhere strictly to international human rights standards.

We Call On

- **INTERPOL’s General Assembly and CCF to urgently implement robust safeguards against political abuse;**
- **Democratic governments to scrutinize and suspend cooperation with regimes that systematically exploit Red Notices;**
- **Media and civil society to amplify the voices of those silenced by the misuse of this system;**
- **We also call upon regional and international courts to develop jurisprudence addressing politically motivated misuse of INTERPOL, and to ensure that no extradition is granted without independent judicial scrutiny.**
- **We additionally call upon both bodies to review and adopt the twenty-one reform proposals set forth in the previous chapter as a practical roadmap for restoring institutional integrity;**

- **And finally, **you—the reader—**to speak, write, share, and demand accountability.**

Additional Call to Action

We urge the formation and funding of an independent international task force composed of legal scholars, human rights advocates, and data transparency experts to:

- **Monitor politically motivated Red Notices in real time;**
- **Provide legal support to victims targeted by authoritarian regimes;**
- **Establish an open-access database documenting cases of INTERPOL abuse;**
- **And recommend policy reforms to international bodies and democratic states.**

Such a coordinated initiative can serve as a permanent watchdog, not only to deter future violations but also to empower those who stand on the front lines of justice with legal tools, institutional memory, and global solidarity.

“Because protecting justice requires more than awareness—it requires structure, persistence, and collective will.

Because silence is unintentionally complicity.

History will not judge us by what we intended—but by what we failed to prevent.

And in a world where authoritarian regimes are learning to speak the language of law to commit injustice, our refusal to respond is no longer an option.

Let this book be not the end of a conversation, but the beginning of a movement for real justice and the defence of human rights law.”



This book is the first volume of a planned trilogy.

The upcoming volumes will continue this interview series, aiming to further raise global awareness and help prevent violations of international human rights protections.

Volume II will delve deeper into domestic legal frameworks, the role of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence, and the regime's extrajudicial tools—such as assassination, blackmail, and coercive diplomacy. It will expose the inner workings of Iran's INTERPOL bureau, its infiltration strategies, and its evolving machinery of transnational repression beyond the legal realm.

Appendices

Documents, Letters, and Translations

In compiling a substantial portion of this book, we relied directly on the testimony and first-hand eyewitness account of a former Iranian police officer. Indeed, there is no stronger testimony than that of a living witness to ongoing, grave injustices. However, the majority of his statements have also been carefully verified against extensive official documentation and evidence. These documents have been authenticated and, in several cases, officially recognised by courts outside Iran, including supreme courts, certified translators, security authorities, and governmental institutions in various countries.

Throughout his testimony, this former officer showed us a substantial volume of documents—approximately more than 500 pages in total. However, none of these documents can be published here, as we do not possess explicit authorization from him to do so. Furthermore, all documents and evidence that have been published in this book were disclosed solely with the official written permission of the victim or The former Iranian officer.

All referenced documents and materials are fully available for submission upon formal request by credible human rights institutions, legitimate and impartial courts, as well as the United Nations or the

European Parliament. The former Iranian police officer has also explicitly stated his willingness to provide comprehensive testimony before any of these reputable institutions.

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85. Verified legal documents and case files submitted by the legal representatives of the victim featured in this book.

These structured and meticulously organized appendices provide comprehensive documentation, ensure transparent sourcing, and offer clear mechanisms for independent verification—strengthening the book’s factual foundation and credibility against any claims of inaccuracy or exaggeration.

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About the Author

Hope Paradise is not a public figure. There are no interviews, no social platforms, no personal spotlight—only a quiet, determined voice committed to documenting truth where others look away.

Hope Paradise is not one person—Hope Paradise is the voice of all victims of persecution, torture, harassment, and execution.

Over time, Hope Paradise became a witness—not to events firsthand, but to the stories of those who lived them. Survivors of torture, exile, arbitrary imprisonment, and systemic abuse entrusted their accounts to this author, not for fame or pity, but to ensure that their suffering would not be forgotten. Their voices, often ignored by official records, are preserved here with respect and precision.

Each narrative captured by Hope Paradise is more than just testimony. It is a fragment of history that might otherwise be erased. With deep compassion, careful verification, and an unwavering commitment to justice, Hope Paradise collects these fragments and gives them form—so that readers around the world may understand what it means to live under regimes that rule by fear.

This book, like others that may follow, is part of an evolving archive—not built by institutions, but grounded in memory, trust, verified testimony, and official documentation.

Hope Paradise writes not to provoke, but to reveal. Not to judge, but to document. And always, to remember.

Because truth, once spoken—even in whispers—cannot be silenced.

“Hope Paradise is a truth-seeker”

Hope Paradise is currently developing a series of forthcoming titles that continue her focus on exposing systematic injustice, state violence, and the global misuse of power. These upcoming books will delve deeper into real-life accounts of victims and survivors, blending legal analysis, investigative research, and first-hand testimony.

Among the forthcoming titles are:

- ***The Operation Redlist Volume II and III*** – a three-volume exposé on the authoritarian regimes’ exploitation of international legal mechanisms to target political dissidents abroad
- ***Hellish Nightmares Trilogy*** – a three-volume investigation into gender-based repression, systemic abuse and torture
- ***46 Days of Captivity*** – a documented narrative of political imprisonment and the psychological toll of prolonged isolation

- *The Devil's Detention Centre* – an exposé on institutional torture and hidden detention centres

Further details will be announced through official publishing channels.



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